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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
59-2-1(11 Slicii: t title. 
This chapter is known as the ' I )vj •* * ' • "• * ,:' ' I a x ^ ct " 
History: C. 1953, 59 2 101, enacted b eliminate or provide for a substantial reduction 
1987, ch. 4, § 48. in state and local government reliance on the 
Tax Elimination Committee. — Laws property tax" and report its plan to the Revenue 
1996, ch. 315, §§ 1 to 4 establish the Tax and Taxation Interim Committee before De-
Elimination Blue Ribbon Committee, consist- cember 31,1996. Section 9 of the act repeals the 
ing of seven members each of the House and act on December 31, 1996. 
Senate. The committee is to "develop a plan to 
59-2-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter and title: 
(1) "Aerial applicator" means aircraft or rotorcraft used exclusively for 
the purpose of engaging in dispensing activities directly affecting agricul-
ture or horticulture with an airworthiness certificate from the Federal 
Aviation Administration certifying the aircraft or rotorcraft's use for 
agricultural and pest control purposes. 
(2) "Air charter service" means an air carrier operation which requires 
the customer to hire an entire aircraft rather than book passage in 
whatever capacity is available on a scheduled trip. 
(3) "Air contract service" means an air carrier operation available only 
to customers who engage the services of the carrier through a contractual 
agreement and excess capacity on any trip and is not available to the 
public at large. 
(4) "Airline" means any air carrier operating interstate routes on a 
scheduled basis which offers to fly passengers or cargo on the basis of 
available capacity on regularly scheduled routes. 
(5) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of 
property as assessed by the county assessor and the commission and may 
be maintained manually or as a computerized file as a consolidated record 
or as multiple records by type, classification, or categories. 
(6) "Certified revenue levy" means a property tax levy that provides the 
same amount of ad valorem property tax revenue as was collected for the 
prior year, plus new growth, but exclusive of revenue from collections from 
redemptions, interest, and penalties. 
(7) (a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, 
or any improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the 
incorrect parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer \ •:•> 
assessing authority; 
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the 
failure of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements 
of this chapter; or 
(hi) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing 
authority based upon incomplete or erroneous information fur-
nished by the taxpayer. 
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PROPERTY TAX ACT 59-2-103 
rolls'" in Subsection (5,)(a)(ii) (now Subsection 
(6)(a)(iij). 
The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, 
added Subsection (6) and redesignated the fol-
lowing subsections accordingly. 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, 
in the definition of "public utility," deleted "com-
mon carrier'' from the list of entities in the first 
sentence and deleted "warehousemen" from the 
exception in the second sentence. 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1990, ch. 
212, which amended the definition of "fair mar-
ket value,'" provides in § 45 that if any provi-
sion of this act, or the application of any provi-
sion to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of the act is to be given 
effect without the invalid provision or applica-
tion. 
Retrospective Operation, Laws 1995, 
ch. 271, § 21 provides that this section has 
retrospective operation to January 1, 1995. 
Cross-References. — Railroad rolling stock 
as personalty, Utah Const., Art. XII, § 14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Escaped property. 
Fair market value. 
Improvement. 
Real estate. 
Cited. 
Escaped property. 
Property that received a tax exemption due 
to a mistake by the county was not "escaped 
property" under the statutory definition, thus 
preventing the county from retroactively as-
sessing additional taxes on the property. First 
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 866 P.2d 
1250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Fair market value. 
A stock purchaser is generally not a "knowl-
edgeable buyer" as required by the definition of 
"fair market value" in this section. Utah Ass'n 
of Counties v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. MCI Telecom-
munications Corp., 895 P.2d 825 (Utah 1995). 
Improvement. 
The test of whether property is an "improve-
ment" to real property for tax purposes is 
whether it is "erected upon or affixed to the 
land." Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 
961 (Utah 1996). 
It is clear from the wording of Subsection (12) 
that the legislature contemplated that im-
provements might be made to property in 
which types of interest other than title may be 
held and since the legislature did not specifi-
cally exclude "leased property" from those 
nontitle lands, improvements to leased prop-
erty are included in this definition. Crossroads 
Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P2d 961 (Utah 1996). 
Real estate. 
An engine and boiler built into a brick foun-
dation and firmly affixed by bolts leaded down 
and used in underground workings of a mine 
are included in term "real estate." Mammoth 
Mining Co. v. Juab County, 10 Utah 232, 37 P. 
348 (1894). 
Cited in Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1993); Utah 
Ass'n of Counties v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. AT & T 
Co., 895 P.2d 819 (Utah 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Software 
Taxation: A Critical Reevaluation of the Notion 
of Intangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 859. 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and 
Local Taxation §§ 1, 2. 
C.J.S. 8 4 C.J.S. Taxation § 66. 
Key Numbers. — Taxation ®== 58. 
59-2-103 'Rate of assessment of property — Residential 
property. 
(1) All tangible taxable pi operty shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform 
and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, 
unless otherwise provided by law. 
(2) Beginning January 1,1995, the fair market value of residential property 
shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential exemption allowed under 
Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. 
59-2-103 REV - - *.*. w «AT 
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for the 
residential exemption 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-103, enacted by L. 
1987, ch*4, § 50; 1988, ch. 3, § 91; 1991, ch. 
263, § 3;1994,ch.310,§ 2; 1995, ch. 275, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1994, in Subsection 
(2), substituted "January 1, 1994" for "January 
1, 1991." deleted "until December 31, 1991, the 
fair market value of residential property shall 
be reduced by 29.159c, and beginning January 
1, 1992, and every year thereafter" before "the 
fair market," and substituted "329cr for 
"29.507c." 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
in Subsection (2), substituted "1995" for "1994," 
substituted "45^" for "32%," and made a stylis-
tic change. 
Property Tax Task Force. - Laws 1995, 
ch. 162, § 1 creates the Property Tax Task 
Force, to consist of thirteen legislators; the task 
force has essentially the same composition and 
ANALYSIS 
Building restrictions and easements. 
Burden of proof. 
County assessor to appraise property. 
Exemptions. 
Improvements. 
Judicial interference. 
Nonresidents' property. 
Priorities. 
Remedies of taxpayer against assessment. 
State-owned land. 
Taxing power. 
Tax rates. 
Unity of use doctrine. 
Words and phrases defined. 
Building restrictions and e a semen t s . 
To assess property without regard to a build-
ing restriction or an easement would be to 
assess it without regard to the nature and 
extent of the property interest which the as-
sessed owner has in the land, in complete 
disregard of its fair cash value which would be 
in violation of this section. Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 
Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781, 168 A.L.R. 513 (1946) 
(prior to "fair market" standard). 
Burden of proof. 
Burden to show inequality of assessment is 
on taxpayer. First Nat'l Bank v. Christensen, 39 
Utah 568, 118 P. 778 (1911). 
County assessor to a p p r a i s e proper ty , 
It is the duty of the county assessors to make 
appraisal of all of the individual property in the 
duties as the task force created by former § 
59-2-106, enacted in 1994 and repealed in 1995. 
The task force is to "address issues facing the 
property tax system including: (a) appraisal of 
property; (b) measurement of assessment qual-
ity; (c) factoring and other methods of valuation 
adjustments; (d) property tax exemptions; and 
(e) certified rate calculations." The task force is 
to report to the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee on or before the December 1995 
interim committee meeting. It will be funded by 
a $41,500 appropriation from the General 
Fund. Section 5 of the act repeals the act on 
December 31, 1995. 
Cross-References . — Constitutional taxa-
tion provisions generally, Utah Const., Art. 
XIII. 
Indians' property, Utah Const., Art. Ill, § 2. 
Nonresident citizens, taxation, Utah Const., 
Art. Ill, § 2. 
state. The authority of the State Tax Commis-
sion over local assessments is a general super-
visory one and the commission should not in-
tervene to take over or interfere with the duty 
of the assessors except in unusual circum-
stances. University Heights, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 196, 364 P.2d 661 (1961). 
\ 
Exemptions. •; 
In order to relieve any species of property 
from its due and just proportion of burdens of 
government, language relied on as creating 
exemption from taxation should be so clear as 
not to admit of reasonable controversy about its 
meaning, since all doubts must be resolved 
against exemption. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 
242, 48 P. 1097 (1897,)., 
Improvements. 
Assessment for certain year of improvements 
not complete on first day of such year was 
proper since all property, although in course of 
construction, if it possesses value, should be 
assessed at its cash value. Union Portland 
Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 64 Utah 335, 
230 P. 1020 (1924; (decided prior to "fair mar-
ket" standard). 
Judicial interference. 
Unless tax laws conflict with some constitu-
tional provision, either expressly or by implica-
tion, courts have no authority to prevent their 
execution. Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 
368, 57 P. 1 (1899). 
Nonresidents' property. 
As against contention of foreign corporation 
DlvMHO.VS 
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that taxation of its refrigerator cars in Utah 
was forbidden by U.S. Constitution because 
such cars had no situs in Utah for purpose of 
taxation and tax on them would impose burden 
on interstate commerce, held that cars were 
taxable in Utah on basis of average number 
thereof used and employed by their owner in 
Utah during year for which assessment was 
made. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 
177 U.S. 149, 20 S. Ct. 631, 44 L. Ed. 708 
(1900). 
Property brought into state even temporarily 
by nonresident corporation is taxable in county 
where used or located. Hamilton & Gleason Co. 
v. Emery County, 75 Utah 406, 285 P. 1006 
(1930). 
Priorities. 
Taxes for general governmental purposes are 
paramount to all other demands against prop-
erty to which tax lien attaches. Ingraham v. 
Hanson, 297 U.S. 378, 56 S. Ct. 511, 80 L. Ed. 
728 (1936). 
Remedies of taxpayer against assessment. 
Those whose property is intentionally as-
sessed at higher percentage or valuation than 
was placed on general mass of taxable property 
in county may invoke aid of courts to compel 
taxing officers to reduce excessive assessment 
so made to same proportion of value as was 
placed upon general mass of other taxable 
property in county. First Natl Bank v. 
Christensen, 39 Utah 568, 118 P. 778 (1911). 
State-owned land. 
Where the state holds title to land in its 
governmental capacity, the property is exempt 
from taxation under the constitutional man-
date. Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 
104 Utah 365, 140 R2d 335 (1943). 
Taxing power. 
State's power of taxation is not within appli-
cation of or limited by Utah Const. Art. I, § 22, 
the eminent domain provision. Kimball v. 
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1,45 L.R.A. 
628 (1899). 
The power to tax is purely a legislative func-
tion, and unless the Legislature has provided 
for the taxation of the property, any attempt to 
levy and assess a tax on the property is void. 
Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Comm'n, 110 
Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946). 
Tax rates. 
The fixing of tax rates is a legislative and not 
a judicial function. Intermountain Title Guar. 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 107 Utah 222, 152 
P.2d 724 (1944). 
Unity of use doctrine. 
The doctrine of unity of use for purpose of 
determining assessment for taxation cannot be 
applied to manufacturing or other similar 
plants or industries which may be under com-
mon ownership, but used or operated in differ-
ent states. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake 
County, 60 Utah 491, 210 P. 106, 27 A.L.R. 874 
(1922). 
Words and phrases defined. 
"Proportion,'' as used in first sentence of Utah 
Const. Art. XIII, § 2, has reference to sameness 
or likeness in value of property; that is, all 
property must be taxed at same relative value. 
State ex rel. Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 
86, 50 P. 615 (1897). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note: Property Tax 
Assessment and the Utah Constitution — A 
Taxpayer's Dilemma, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 491. 
Note, Financing Modernized and Unmod-
ernized Local Government in the Age of 
Aquarius, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 30. 
Housing in Salt Lake County — A Place to 
Live for the Poor, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 193. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and 
Local Taxation § 191 et seq.; § 704 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 229, 361. 
A.L.R. — Judicial notice as to assessed valu-
ations, 42 A.L.R.3d 1439. 
Key Numbers. — Taxation s=> 4, 347. 
59-2-104. Situs of property for tax purposes. 
(1) The situs of all taxable property is the tax area where it is located. 
(2) Personal property, unless assessed by the commission, shall be assessed 
in the tax area where the owner is domiciled in this state on January 1, unless 
the owner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the county assessor that the 
personal property is usually kept in a tax area other than that of the domicile 
of the owner, in which case that property shall be assessed in the other tax 
area. 
(3) Land shall be assessed in parcels or subdivisions not exceeding 640 acres 
each, and tracts of land containing more than 640 acres, which have been 
63 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Intangibles. 
Constitutionality. 
The property tax exemption available only 
for residential property used as a primary resi-
dence, the definition of "residential property" in 
this section and 59-2-103(2), does not violate 
Article III, Sec. 2 of the Utah Constitution. 
Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 
1997). 
Intangibles. 
Customized computer software is considered 
intangible property to be exempted from taxa-
tion. Cache County v. State Tax Comm'n, 922 
P.2d 758 (Utah 1996). 
59-2-103. Rate of assessment of property — Residential 
property. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Tax rates. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The residential property tax exemption in § 
59-2-102 and this section does not violate Ar-
ticle III, Sec. 2 of the Utah Constitution. Dennis 
v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 1997). 
Tax rates. 
County assessments are required to meet the 
standards of uniformity and equality set forth 
in the Utah Constitution and reflect fair mar-
ket value pursuant to the Utah Code. If state-
ments within the Commission's decisions im-
pede the fulfillment of these constitutional and 
statutory directives, the Commission's state-
ments must be ignored. Alta Pac. Assocs. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103 (Utah 
1997). 
In determining an apartment buildings fair 
market value, the Commission justifiably re-
jected the use of market rents and endorsed the 
use of actual contract rents collected. Since the 
subsidized apartments in this case were 
treated no differently than other apartments, 
no classification was made, and thus no consti-
tutional violation occurred. Alta Pac. Assocs. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103 (Utah 
1997). 
Cited in Nelson v. Board of Equalization, 943 
P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997). 
PART 2 
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY 
59-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determination of 
value of mining property — Notification of as-
sessment — Local assessment of property as-
sessed by the unitary method. 
(1) By May 1 of each year the following property, unless otherwise exempt 
under the Utah Constitution or under Part 11 of this chapter, shall be assessed 
by the commission at 100# of fair market value, as valued on January 1, in 
accordance with this chapter: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (2), all property which operates as 
a unit across county lines, if the values must be apportioned among more 
than one county or state; 
(b) all property of public utilities; 
(c^ all operating property of an airline, air charter service, and air 
contract service; 
(d^ all geothermal fluids and geothermal resources; 
(e) all mines and mining claims except in cases, as determined by the 
commission, where the mining claims are used for other than mining 
Tab 2 
59-2-1011 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
59-2-1011. Record of changes — Form and contents of 
affidavit. 
The county auditor shall make a record of all changes, corrections, and 
orders and before October 15 shall affix an affidavit to the record, subscribed by 
the auditor, in a form substantially as follows: 
I , do swear that, as county auditor of county, I have 
kept correct minutes of all acts of the county board of equalization 
regarding alterations to the assessment rolls, that all alterations agreed to 
or directed to be made have been made and entered on the rolls, and that 
no changes or alterations have been made except those authorized by the 
board or the commission. 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-1011, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 3, § 144. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1988, ch. 3, § 144, repeals former § 59-2-1011, 
as amended by Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 218, 
relating to appeals from the county board or 
commission, and enacts the present section, 
effective February 9, 1988. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavits. 
Duty to make record. 
Affidavits. 
Failure of auditor to attach his affidavit to 
assessment rolls is a fatal defect. Telonis v. 
Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513 (1943). 
Tax deed issued to county is invalid if county 
auditor fails to affix his affidavit to assessment 
rolls. Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 
R2d 239 (1946). 
Tax title founded on assessment unsupported 
by auditor's affidavits is fatally defective. 
Sperry v. Tollev, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d 542 
(1948). 
Although failure to make or subscribe audi-
tor's affidavit will not affect validity of assess-
ment, that affidavit is condition precedent to 
valid tax deed from county. Jenkins v. Morgan, 
113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948); Cooper v. 
Carter Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320 
(1957). 
Tax deed from a sale of property for delin-
quent taxes was void where year's assessment 
roll did not have attached to it the auditor's 
affidavit. Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 260 
P.2d 542 (1953). 
Duty to make record. 
Although sometimes the county clerk makes 
a record of proceedings of board of equalization, 
the county auditor is generally to make such 
records. Board of Educ. v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 
576, 280 P. 1065 (1929). 
59-2-1012 to 59-2-1016. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Laws 1988, ch. 3, § 268 repeals 
§§ 59-2-1012 to 59-2-1016, as amended by 
Laws 1987, ch. 4, §§ 141 to 145, relating to the 
commission's decision on appeals, applications 
and hearings on correction of assessments, in-
vestigations by the commission, and equaliza-
tion of assessments, effective February 9, 1988. 
For present provisions comparable to those in 
former §§ 59-2-1012 to 59-2-1016, see §§ 59-2-
1006 to 59-2-1010. 
PART 11 
EXEMPTIONS 
Revision of Part — Laws 1988, ch. 3 revised this part, repealing provisions and reenacting 
similar provisions in different sections, effectively renumbering most of the sections of this part 
The table below shows the location in present Part 11, as revised by L. 1988, ch. 3, of sections 
comparable to sections in former Part 11. as last amended by L. 1987, ch. 4. 
142 
PROPERTY TAX ACT 59-2-1101 
Former Corresponding 
Section Section 
59-2-1102 59-2-1103 
59-2-1103 59-2-1104 
59-2-1104 59-2-1105 
59-2-1105 59-2-1106 
59-2-1106 59-2-1107 
59-2-1107 59-2-1108 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2503; L. 
1909,ch.94,§ 1;C.L.1917,§ 5863; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 80-2-1; 1986, ch. 57, § 2; C. 1953, 
59-2-1; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 38; 
1987, ch. 93, § 2; 1988, ch. 3, § 145; 1989, ch. 
Former Corresponding 
Section Section 
59-2-1108 59-2-1109 
59-2-1109 59-2-1110 
59-2-1110 59-2-1111 
59-2-1111 59-2-1112 
59-2-1112 59-2-1113 
59-2-1113 59-2-1114 
204, § 5; 1993, ch. 227, § 345. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted 
"county legislative body" for "county governing 
body" in Subsection (4). 
59-2-1101. Exemption of property devoted to public, reli-
gious, or charitable uses — Proportional pay-
ments for government-owned property — Intan-
gibles exempt — Affidavit required. 
(1) The exemptions authorized by this part may be allowed only if the 
claimant is the owner of the property as of January 1 of the year the exemption 
is claimed, unless the claimant is a federal, state, or political subdivision entity 
under Subsection (2)(a), (b), or (c), in which case the entity shall collect and pay 
a proportional tax based upon the length of time that the property was not 
owned by the entity. 
(2) The following property is exempt from taxation: 
(a) property exempt under the laws of the United States; 
(b) property of the state, school districts, and public libraries; 
(c) property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all other 
political subdivisions of the state, except as provided in Title 11, Chapter 
13, the Interlocal Cooperation Act; 
(d) property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for 
religious, charitable, or educational purposes; 
(e) places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; 
(f) farm equipment and machinery; and 
(g) intangible property. 
(3) (a) The owner who receives exempt status for property, if required by 
the commission, shall file an affidavit, on or before March 1 each year, 
certifying the use to which the property has been placed during the past 
year. The affidavit shall contain the following information in summary 
form: 
(i) identity of affiant; 
(ii) the basis of the affiant's knowledge of the use of the property; 
(iii) authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the owner; 
(iv) county where property is located; and 
(v) nature of use of the property, 
(b) If the affidavit is not filed within the time limits prescribed by the 
county board of equalization, the exempt status may, after notice and 
hearing, be revoked and the property then placed on the tax rolls. 
(4) The county legislative body may adopt rules to effectuate the exemptions 
provided in this part. 
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Cross-References. — Constitutional taxa-
tion provisions generally, Utah Const., Art. 
XIII. 
Exemptions: 
Armories. § 39-2-1. 
Constitutional exemptions, Utah Const., Art. 
XIII. § 2. 
Exemptions reserved to United States, En-
abling Act. $ 3. 
ANALYSIS 
Charitable purposes. 
Extent of exemption. 
Federal property. 
General construction. 
Power of Legislature. 
Public property. 
Sale of electric power by city. 
Sewer connection and service charges. 
Utah State Retirement Fund property. 
Char i t ab le purposes. 
Where fraternal order, purpose and object of 
which was to promote good fellowship among 
its members and for charitable purposes, con-
ducted social club for benefit of members, and 
part of clubroom was used as buffet where 
liquors, meals and cigars were sold to members, 
the net profits derived being devoted to chari-
table purposes, clubhouse was exempt from 
taxation. Salt Lake Lodge No. 85 v. Groesbeck, 
40 Utah 1, 120 P. 192, 1914C Ann. Cas. 940 
(1911). But see Loyal Order of Moose, # 259 v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 
1982), overruling Groesbeck in part and hold-
ing that, but for true de minimis uses, the 
constitutional exemption for charitable proper-
ties is to be strictly construed, and the chari-
table use must be exclusive. 
In determining whether a hospital is entitled 
to exemption from taxation under this section 
on the ground that it is used exclusively for 
"charitable purposes," the test is whether it is 
maintained for the purpose of charity or for 
profit, and if hospital is incorporated, the an-
swer to that question depends upon its powers 
as denned in its charter as well as upon the 
manner in which it is conducted, and the cor-
poration itself is concluded by the declaration of 
its charter in respect to its purpose and object. 
William Budge Mem. Hosp. v. Maughan, 79 
Utah 516. 3 P.2d 258, rehearing denied, 79 
Utah 529, 13 P.2d 1119 (1932). 
Fraternal organization's lot and the lodge 
building built thereon were not entitled to a tax 
exemption on the basis of charitable use where 
the activities conducted in the lodge consisted 
chiefly of drinking, card playing, dancing, and 
other social, rather than fraternal functions, 
and the organization's expenditures on chari-
Fraternal insurance societies, § 31A-9-601. 
Indians' property, Utah Const., Art. Ill, § 2. 
Nonresident citizens, taxation, LTtah Const., 
Art. Ill, § 2. 
Privilege tax on possession and use of tax-
exempt property, § 59-4-101. 
School property generally, § 53A-3-408. 
table objects amounted to only slightly more 
than 2% of total expenditures. Baker v. One 
Piece of Improved Real Property, 570 R2d 1023 
(Utah 1977). 
The State Tax Commission's charitable prop-
erty tax exemption standards for nonprofit hos-
pitals and nursing homes are constitutional 
because they comply with factors previously 
established in Utah County ex rel. County Bd. 
of Equalization v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985), for granting a 
charitable use property tax exemption. Howell 
v. County Bd. ex rel. IHC Hosp., 881 P.2d 880 
(Utah 1994). 
Extent of exemption. 
Exemption of property of benevolent society 
extends only to such part of that property as is 
occupied and used "exclusively" for charitable 
purposes and not to part thereof held as source 
of revenue, especially when value of each such 
part of property is separately ascertainable. 
Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 (1901); 
Salt Lake Lodge No. 85 v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 1, 
120 P. 192 (1911), overruled on other grounds, 
Loyal Order of Moose, # 259 v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982). 
Where portion of certain property owned by 
charitable institution was occupied and used by 
it for charitable purposes, and other portion 
thereof was rented to stores for purposes of 
revenue, portion used and occupied for chari-
table purposes was exempt, and portion rented 
out was subject to taxation. Odd Fellows' Bldg. 
Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 177 P. 214 (1918). 
Federal property. 
While taxes imposed by state law may not be 
laid directly upon property or activities of fed-
eral government itself or of any of its instru-
mentalities, private property and interests may 
be subjected to taxation under state law even 
though they bear close relation to activities of 
United States. Salt Lake County v. Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 163 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1947), 
cert, denied, 333 U.S. 832, 68 S. Ct. 458, 92 L. 
Ed. 1116 (1948). 
General construction. 
In order to relieve any species of property 
from its due and just proportion of burdens of 
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o-overnment language relied on as creating 
exemption from taxation should be so clear as 
not to admit of reasonable controversy about its 
meaning since all doubts must be resolved 
against exemption Accordingly, court will not 
aid or enlarge exemptions from taxation by 
interpretation Judge v Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 
48 P 1097 (1897) 
Legislation, claimed to grant immunity from 
taxation, will be strictly interpreted against 
exemption Union Refrigerator Transit Co v 
Lynch 18 Utah 378, 55 P 639 (1898), affd, 177 
U S 149, 20 S Ct 631, 44 L Ed 708 (1900) 
Power of Leg is la tu re . 
Legislature has no power to exempt from 
taxation property not exempt therefrom under 
Constitution Judge v Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 
P 1097 (1897; 
Public p roper ty . 
Property owned by cities is absolutely ex-
empt, and the exempt status of such property 
depends upon no condition but ownership by 
the city Spnngville v Johnson, 10 Utah 351,37 
P 577(1894) 
Where the state holds title to land in its 
go\ ernmental capacity, the property is exempt 
trom taxation under the constitutional man-
date Duchesne County v State Tax Comm, 
104 Utah 365, 140 P2d 335 (1943) 
Where state accepted deed of land from de-
faulting mortgagor, rather than foreclose the 
mortgage given upon purchase of the land from 
the state, the state could not claim the land free 
from county taxes levied while the mortgagor 
had the title, since such would not be within 
listed exemption from taxation and would con-
stitute an abatement of taxes State v Salt 
Lake County, 96 Utah 464, 85 P2d 851 (1938), 
State v Duchesne County, 96 Utah 482, 85 P2d 
860 (1938) 
Lands, title to which is acquired by the state 
by foreclosure of mortgage or conveyance for 
the extinguishment of a debt for money loaned 
from the state school fund, are exempt from 
taxation Duchesne County v State Tax 
Comm , 104 Utah 365, 140 P2d 335 (1943) 
Sale of electric power by city. 
Sales tax on sales of electrical energy by 
municipality does not offend Utah Const Art 
XIII, § 2, because city may pass tax on to 
consumer Even though city is required to pay 
the tax, the tax may not be said to be a tax on 
its property State Tax Comm v City of Logan, 
88 Utah 406, 54 P2d 1197 (1936) 
Sewer connection and service charges. 
Charges by city levied against board of edu-
cation for connections to city sewer system and 
services thereof were mere payments for ser-
vices enjoyed by the board and were not "taxes" 
or "assessments" from which board was ex-
empt Murray City v Board of Educ , 16 Utah 
2d 115, 396 P2d 628 (1964) 
Utah State Retirement Fund property. 
Real property of the Utah State Retirement 
Fund was "property of the state" within the 
meaning of Utah Const, Art XIII, § 2, and was 
therefore tax-exempt Utah State Retirement 
Office v Salt Lake County, 780 P2d 813 (Utah 
1989) (decided under former § 59-2-1) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Financing Mod-
ernized and Unmodernized Local Government 
m the Age of Aquarius, 1971 Utah L Rev 30 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 71 Am Jur 2d State and 
Local Taxation §§ 191 et seq , 307 et seq 
C.J.S. - 84 C J S Taxation §§ 282, 289 et 
&eq 
A.L.R. — Construction of statute or regula-
tion exempting gifts to foreign charitable, edu-
cational or religious body on reciprocal basis, 12 
A L R 3 d 9 1 8 
Garage or parking lot as within tax exemp-
tion extended to property of educational, chari-
table or hospital organizations, 33 A L R 3d 
93£ 
Receipt of pay from beneficiaries as affecting 
tax exemption of charitable institutions, 37 
A L R 3 d l l 9 1 
Exemption of parsonage or residence of min-
ister, pnest, rabbi or other church personnel, 55 
A L R 3d 356 
Tax exemption for religious societies or insti-
tutions 28 A L R 4th 344 
Exemption from real-propert} taxation of 
residential facilities maintained b\ hospital for 
patients, staff, or others, 61 A L R 4th 1105 
Nursing homes as exempt from property 
taxation 34 A L R 5th 529 
Key Numbers. - Taxation o 241 to 244 
59-2-1102. Determination of exemptions by board of 
equalization — Appeal. 
(1) The county board of equalization may, after giving notice in a manner 
prescribed by rule, determine whether certain property withm the county is 
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October 31,1996 
rfflTJfTED MAIL 
Glen C Thompson 
Sumnrii County Treasurer 
PO. Box 128 
CJoajviDc UT 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A-E^Inc, a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Qub at Deer 
Valley. The corporation b sending you a check in the amount of $40^72.00 in payment of 
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley 
Utah. The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are 
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the 
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county 
and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the 
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest. 
Sincerely, 
A E., INC. 
a Utah Corporanon 
Tab 4 
PROPERTY TAX ACT 59-2-1327 
59-2-1327, Payment of tax under protest — Circum-
stances where authorized — Action to recover 
tax paid. 
Where a tax is demanded or enforced by a taxing entity, and the person 
whose property is taxed claims the tax is unlawful, that person may pay the 
tax under protest to the county treasurer. The person may then bring an action 
in the district court against the officer or taxing entity to recover the tax or any 
portion of the tax paid under protest. 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-1327, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 3, § 184. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1988, ch. 3, § 184 repeals former § 59-2-1327, 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality of tax. 
Construction and application. 
Inheritance taxes. 
Payment under protest not necessary. 
Pleadings. 
Proof. 
Protest. 
Right of recovery in general. 
Standing. 
Statute of limitations. 
Suit against state in federal courts. 
Void levy. 
Constitutionality of tax. 
The constitutionality or legality of the tax 
statutes may be raised as issues in an action in 
a district court after payment under protest or 
in an action to enjoin collection. State Tax 
Comm'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979). 
Construction and application. 
In cases in which legality or illegality of tax 
sought to be recovered by taxpayer necessarily 
involves determination of questions of law call-
ing for exercise of strictly judicial functions, 
payment under protest and compliance with 
other provisions of the statutes afford the ex-
clusive remedy. Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 
Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941). 
Inheritance taxes. 
Inheritance taxes paid under protest on 
mongage bonds of Utah corporation, held by 
nonresident citizen of foreign state at time of 
death, were recoverable in action brought un-
der this provision. McLaughlin v. Cluff, 66 Utah 
245, 240 P. 161, 42 A.L.R. 347 (1925). 
Payment under protest not necessary. 
where owners were improperly taxed, it was 
not necessary to pay under protest and be put 
to expense of lawsuit until administrative rem-
as amended by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 205, relating to 
the effect of the extension of the delinquency 
date on subsequent proceedings, and enacts the 
present section, effective February 9, 1988. 
edies were exhausted. Baker v. Tax Comm'n, 
520 P.2d 203 (Utah 1974). 
Pleadings. 
Complaint in action to recover taxes paid was 
not subject to demurrer because it did not state 
specifically why taxing officers had no authority 
to levy and collect taxes. Salt Lake County v. 
Utah Copper Co., 294 F. 199 (8th Cir. 1923), 
cert, denied, 264 U.S. 590, 44 S. Ct. 403, 68 L. 
Ed. 864 (1924), appeal dismissed, 267 U.S. 610, 
45 S. Ct. 461, 69 L. Ed. 813 (1925). 
Complaint, in action against county to re-
cover illegal tax paid by plaintiff, which sets 
forth portion of levy alleged to be unlawful, 
demand for and receiving of illegal tax by duly 
qualified treasurer and collector of defendant, 
and plaintiffs payment of tax under protest 
stated cause of action. Centennial Eureka Min-
ing Co. v. Juab County, 22 Utah 395, 62 P. 1024 
(1900). 
To state a cause of action to recover back a 
tax paid under protest, the complaint must 
distinctly allege facts that render the tax ille-
gal. Utah Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62 
Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (1923). 
Proof. 
In action to recover illegal tax, paid under 
protest, it was not necessary for plaintiff to 
prove that tax was paid under duress. Centen-
nial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22 
Utah 395, 62 P. 1024 (1900). 
In action by cattle owner to recover taxes 
paid under protest, in view of fact cattle were 
not so located that assessor could count them, 
by reason that they were scattered over vast 
territory through hills and mountains and on 
public domain, assessor was justified in avail-
ing himself of any reliable source of information 
which to him seemed trustworthy. Nutter v. 
Carbon County, 58 Utah 1, 196 P. 1009 (1921). 
Protest. 
Where officer is bound to take notice of his 
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want of authoriU to assess, lew. or collect 
certain tax, and tax is paid under protest, 
statement in protest that demand is illegal 
would be useless and is not required Centen-
nial Euieka Mining Co \ Juab Count\. 22 
Utah 395, 62 P 1024(1900) 
No particular form of protest is required, nor 
is it required that protest be in writing it is 
sufficient if payments are made under oral 
protest and noted b\ treasurer on tax records 
Murdock v Murdock, 38 Utah 373 113 P 330 
(1910). 
Right of recovery in general. 
Where tax w as found to be unlaw ful in mat-
ters as to which assessing officer had no discre-
tion, party aggrieved was entitled to remedy 
provided in former section Pmgree Natl Bank 
v Weber County, 54 Utah 599, 183 P 334 
(1919) 
Payment of tax under protest without desig-
nation of the part protested did not deny tax-
payer nght to recover since the precise amount 
wrongfully assessed may be established at 
tnal. Peterson v Bountiful City, 25 Utah 2d 
126, 477 P.2d 153 (1970) 
Standing. 
Plaintiff had sufficient standing to file claim 
who alleged that property tax statute was un-
constitutional in that it taxed a limited amount 
of property, and allowed expenditure of tax 
dollars on religious institutions that paid no 
taxes, thus resulting in his having to pay more 
in property taxes. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 
1145 (Utah 1983) 
Statute of limitations. 
Statute of limitations runs against right to 
recover illegal tax, paid under protest, from 
date on which such tax was paid Centennial 
Eureka Mining Co \ Juab County, 22 Utah 
395, 62 P 1024 (1900) 
Action to recover taxes paid under unconsti-
tutional statute was barred where not brought 
w ithm six months as required by former § 104-
2-27, Code 1943 Sperry & Hutchinson Co v 
Mattson, 64 Utah 214, 228 P. 755 (1924) 
An action under this section against a count\ 
is not subject to the 6-month statute of limita-
tions m § 78-12-31(2), the applicable limita-
tions statute in such a case is § 78-12-25 
Stevensen v Monson, 856 P.2d 355 (Utah Ct 
App ), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) 
Suit against state in federal courts. 
Former section fell short of the clear declara-
tion by a state of its consent to be sued in the 
federal courts that is required before federal 
courts should undertake the adjudication of 
claims of taxpayers against the state 
Kennecott Copper Corp v. State Tax Comm'n, 
327 U.S. 573, 66 S. Ct. 745, 90 L. Ed. 862 
(1946). 
Void levy. 
Where municipality's annexation was void 
because majority of landowners had not re-
quested it as required under former § 10-3-1, 
municipal tax levied upon the land while the 
case was pending was also void. Peterson v 
Bountiful City, 25 Utah 2d 126, 477 P.2d 153 
(1970). 
59-2-1328. Payment under protest — Judgment for recov-
ery — Payment — Tax levy. 
(1) If it is determined in any action that a tax, or any portion of the tax, paid 
under protest, was unlawfully collected, a judgment for recovery of the tax plus 
interest as provided by law, together with costs of action, shall be entered in 
favor of the taxpayer. Upon being presented a duly authenticated copy of the 
judgment, the proper officer or officers of the state, county, or municipality 
whose officers collected or received the tax shall audit and allow the judgment, 
and cause a warrant to be drawn for the amount recovered by the judgment. If 
the judgment is obtained against a county, and any portion of the taxes 
included in the judgment are state, district, school, or other taxes levied by a 
taxing entity which have been or may be paid over to the state or to any school 
district or other taxing entity by the county, the proper officer or officers of the 
state, school district, or other taxing entity shall, upon demand by the county, 
cause a warrant to be drawn upon the treasurer of the state, school district, or 
other taxing entity in favor of the county for the amount of the taxes received, 
together with interest as provided by law and an equitable portion of the costs, 
of the action. 
(2) Each taxing entity may levy a tax to pay its share of the judgment under 
Subsection (1). This levy is in addition to, and exempt from, the maximum levy 
182 
Tab 5 
RESOLUTION NO. 
A RESOLUTION SETTING GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS ON PROPERTY 
TAX REFUNDS TO QUALIFIED PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL TAX PAYERS 
WHEREAS, the* Summit County Commission has determined that 
equitable considerations require differential tax refunds to 
those certain tax payers who qualified for "primary residential 
exemptions", but who paid "secondary residential rate" taxes; 
and, 
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has further determined 
that such differential refunds should only be distributed within 
strict guidelines and to qualified tax payers only, 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED pursuant to the authorisation 
of U.C.A. 59-2-1321, that the County Assessor and County 
Treasurer are hereby directed and authorized to make differential 
refunds as follows: 
1. Refunds may be made of the difference between taxes 
actually paid at the secondary rate which should have been paid 
at the primary residential rate. 
2. Applications shall only be considered for such partial 
refund of taxes paid during tax years 1987 thru 1991 inclusive. 
Applications will only be accepted until 5:00 p.m. August 31, 
1992; thereafter only current year applications will be accepted 
or processed. 
3. Applications for refunds must be accompanied by 
satisfactory and verifiable proof of primary residency status 
during each year the refund is claimed. Such items as voter 
registrations, school registrations, state and federal income tax 
returns, drivers licenses, telephone and utility listings, etc. 
may be accepted as evidence of residency status. 
4. Applications for refunds will only be received or 
accepted from individual tax payers or the tax payer's attorney-
at-law or an attorney-in-fact possessing regularly executed and 
recorded general or special powers of attorney for the tax payer. 
5. Applications for refunds shall be made to the Assessor's 
Office. Any and all refunds shall be made as quickly as possible 
and shall not bear interest. 
6. Applicants who are denied refunds may appeal such denial 
to the Summit County Commission. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED this T~ day of June, 1992. 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSION: 
I 
SHELDON D. RICHINS, CHAIRMAN 
Tab $6 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
Affidavit Of Primary Residence 
Pursuant to 59-2-103 UCA 
I hereby certify that 
1) The tomjkm owner of the following described property (please print name, street address or 
condominium unit number and mailing address).is: 
A, E., Inc., a Utah Corporation Serial § EECrl 
Unit 7 The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley 
c/o Miio S. Marsden, Jr. 
68 South Main, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
t h e of Bret Alan Anderson he has 
2) The above described property is joy permanent, full timeresidenc^and thaf KlWKno 
other permanent residence either in the State of Utah or any other state. 
Date of Occupancy Noventer 20, 1992 
OR 
I am leasing the above described property on a year round basis as of the day of 
_ _ , 1 9 • Attached is a copy of the lease agreement and/or below is the 
name and address of the person (s) the property is being leased to who use this property 
as a primary residence. 
I understand that pursuant to Utah Code 59-2-309 (2), that any misrepresentation of this affidavit 
subjects the owner to severe penalties. 
A.E. Inc. , a Utah Corpc^ aft^ on 
Signed By ^ c *!•» 
Milo S. Marsa^i, Jr., iaqzi Counsel 
Dated February 3, 
Submission of this application authorizes the Assessor to request or collect information sufficient 
to veriiy primary residence status. A listing of criteria used to determine residence status is 
found on the back of this form. 
SUMMIT COUNT* 
Affidavit Of Primary Residence 
Pursuant to 59-2-103 UCA 
I hereby certify that 
1) The fiaocja* owner of die following described property (please print name, street address or 
condominium unit number and mailing address), i s : 
A. E., Inc. , a Utah Corporation Seriali BBC-7 
Unit 7 The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley 
c/o Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
68 South Main, #500 
Salt lake City, UT 84101 
^ of Bret Alan Anderson he has 
2) The above described property is a y permanent, MtiDae«sid«ic^andtJiafMawno 
other permanent residence either in the State of Utah or any other state. 
Date of Occupancy Novenfaer 20, 1992 
OR 
I am leasing the above described property on a year round basis as of the_i___day of 
,19 . Attached is a copy of the lease agreement and/or below is the 
name and address of the person (s) the property is being leased to who use this property 
as a primary residence. 
I understand that pursuant to Utah Code 59-2-309 (2), that any misrepresentation of this affidavit 
subjects the owner to severe penalties. 
A.E. Inc . , a Utah Corpora 
Signed Jy_ 
Milo S. Marsfen, Jr., Esgal Counsel 
Dated February 3, 
Submission of this application authorizes the Assessor to request or collect information sufficient 
to verify primary residence status. A listing of criteria used to determine residence status is 
found on the back of this form. 
Tab? 
B«rb«rtJ.Kx«sMr 
SUMMIT COUHTY COUMT House 
MQoMarsden 
Fifth Floor 
68 South main 
Sah Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: Primary Resident status on lots 7 & 8, Bald Eagle Club @ Deer Vauey 
DearMr.Marsden;
 IwiI1 change the status of these two 
Pursuant to our conversation of Apnl 17,1997wm cn*°s
 onFd,ittary 
properties to Prin^ Resident based on ^ e a p p ^ a ^ ^ ^ 
3,1997. Ttecurrearedttrfonmassessed value ,s 45/, at tom^o ^ 
Thepowertograntrefundsbasedontochangems^WP^
 e a ^ 
t^year does not rest^me Assessor. The A s ^ r c a n ^ e ^ m ^ 
Commissioners. It is my understanding that they would be " « * » ^
 00r comtMi 
if the taxpayer had not filed their exemption application at some p o r t a the p 
^ r ^ u g h * e B o - d of Equalization during me years« quesoon. 
Sr. Staff Appraiser 
Summit County Assesor-s Office 
Tab 3 
MAX_ J I N , CABOONI GorrruDf ON 4 .. JLL, L X . C . 
nrrM rtoo« 
^ . ^ l " — * " " * • • »OWTH MAIN oreouM 
wouwfecijcow.>.ft BAXJt LAJO ClTT, UTAH 8 4 1 0 1 »*•«»' (SOI) S2I-3800 
FAX (SOW 537-13/3 
April 24,1997 
Summit County Commission 
P.O. Box 128 
CoaMDc, UT 84017 
Re- Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8 
Dear Commission Members: 
I represent A £ . Ina, a Utah corporation, which has paid taxes under protest since 
1992 for failure of the Summit County Assessor to grant the residential 45% reduction 
exemption allowed by Article XDI, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and implemented by the 
Utah Legislature as § 59-2-103. 
A copy of the 1997 Assessor's letter granting the exemption is enclosed. 
I am enclosing copies of the 1992 -1996 property tax notices. All payments were 
made in full under protest by certified mail, return receipt requested. I am also enclosing 
the worksheet of the tax difference, $70,182.79. 
It is respectfully requested that you grant the refund because the properties should 
have received the primary residential reduction, but due to the Assessor's error in 
classification, it was not granted. Therefore, it should be refunded at this time. 
If you have any questions, please give me a call. 
Very truly yours, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
MSM/gz 
Enclosures 
0091 
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Barbara J/Kr«t 
Ass«$iof aer 
1909 
S U M M I T COUNTY COUWT House 
August 14, 1997 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C. 
Fifth Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah^JB4101 
Dear Mr. Marsden: 
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to 
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald 
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8. 
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their 
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on 
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on 
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of 
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years. 
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the 
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be 
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year 
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria. 
Sincerely, 
Barbara J . nuresser 
Summit County Assessor 
AUG 18 1997 
PO BOX 128 • COALVtUE. UTAH 040! T 
• V-AX IHOII Ijft 44S0 
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SUMMIT COUNTY 
ORDINANCE NO. ?>\S 
AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR A PROCEDURE 
AND CRITERIA IN GRANTING RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS 
PREAMBLE 
WHEREAS, the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2(8), and U.C.A. 59-2-
102(22) & 103(2) (1953), as amended, provide that a "residential exemption" to property tax 
of 45% is available for "primary residences;" and, 
WHEREAS, neither the State Code, nor Utah State Tax Commission rules, provide a 
definition of "primary residence," except to state that a "transient residential use or 
condominiums used in rental pools" are not considered primary residences; and, 
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, discusses property tax 
exemptions in general, but is silent as to the "residential exemption;" and, 
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, provides for an exemption 
application process, which includes the filing of an affidavit, prior to the granting of a 
property tax exemption; and, 
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1101(4) & 1102(1) state that "[t]he county legislative body 
may adopt rules to effectuate the exemptions provided" and may "determine whether certain 
property within the county is exempt from taxation;" and, 
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1001 states that the County "may make and enforce any 
rule which is consistent with statute and commission rule, and necessary for the government 
of the [Bjoard [of Equalization], the preservation of order and the transaction of business;" 
and, 
WHEREAS, in recognition of the diverse varieties of property ownership in Summit 
County a proper procedure for granting "residential exemptions" and defining the criteria 
allowing for such grants needs to be established; and, 
WHEREAS, it is the opinion of the County Commission that residency should be 
determined by the quality and quantity of the actual occupancy and not by the class of 
structure, nor the intended use of the structure; and, 
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WHEREAS, providing for a standardized procedure and criteria to grant "residential 
exemptions" to property tax, where the State Code and State Tax Commission are silent, is 
in the best interests of Summit County; 
NOW THEREFORE, the County Legislative Body of the County of Summit, the 
State of Utah, ordains as follows: 
Section 1. Procedure. 
A. A property owner or his/her designee (applicant) shall submit an application for 
residential exemption from property taxes to the Summit County Assessor no latter 
than May 22 of the current tax year. An application shall be in the form of an 
affidavit and shall contain, at a minimum, the following information: 
(1) property identification (serial number, address, etc.), 
(2) identity of the applicant/affiant, 
(3) basis of the applicant/affiant's knowledge of the use of the property; 
(4) authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the owner (if applicable), 
(5) county where property is located, and 
(6) nature of use of the property. 
B. In the event that an affidavit is not timely filed, an exemption may be granted by 
the Board of Equalization on an individual appeal basis for the current tax year only. 
At the close of the Board of Equalization, no further appeals for exemptions will be 
considered until the following tax year. 
C. A new affidavit of primary residence must be filed when ownership or the status 
of habitancy changes. Any misrepresentation on the affidavit subjects the owner to a 
penalty equal to the tax on the property's value. 
D. Submission of the affidavit authorizes the Summit County Assessor to request or 
collect information sufficient to verify primary residence status. 
E. If an applicant requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the 
residential exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the 
property serves as a primary residence. The burden of proof shall remain at all times 
with the applicant. 
Section 2. Criteria. 
A. A primary residence is the principal place where one (property owner or 
inhabitant) actually lives as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though 
motels and other transient properties would not meet this definition, rentals (on a 
yearly basis) would qualify for the residential property tax exemption. 
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B. A primary residence shall be defined by the following factors with respect to the 
property owner / property inhabitant (claimant): 
(1) an approved application for residential exemption, 
(2) the presence of the claimant on the voter registry in the area claimed as 
a primary residence, 
(3) the length of continuous residency in the place claimed as a primary 
residence, 
(4) the nature and quality of the living accommodations at the claimed 
primary residence, 
(5) the presence of family members at the claimed primary residence, 
(6) the place of residence of the claimant's spouse, 
(7) the physical location of the claimant's place of business or sources of 
income, 
(8) the physical location of the claimant's banking facilities, 
(9) the location of registration of claimant's vehicles, boats, and RVs, 
(10) claimant's membership in clubs, churches, and other social 
organizations, 
(11) the claimant's addresses used on such things as: 
(a) telephone listings, 
(b) mail, 
(c) state and federal tax returns, 
(d) listings in official government publications or other 
correspondence, 
(e) driver's license, 
(f) voter registration, and 
(g) tax rolls, 
(12) the location of public schools attended by the claimant or his/her 
dependents, 
(13) the nature and payment of taxes in other states, 
(14) declarations of the claimant: 
(a) communicated to third parties, 
(b) contained in deeds, 
(c) contained in insurance policies, 
(d) contained in wills, 
(e) contained in letters, 
(f) contained in registers, 
(g) contained in mortgages, and 
(h) contained in leases, 
(15) the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location, 
(16) the failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a 
resident of the area, 
(17) the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location, and 
(18) the acquisition of a new residence in a different location. 
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C. Where a property owner owns more than one residence in Utah, or elsewhere, 
none of which are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a 
primary residence for purposes of the residential property tax exemption. Only the 
residence which is occupied more than six months out of the year qualifies for the 
residential exemption. 
D. Married couples may only claim one property as* a primary residence except 
where separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved 
separation agreement. 
E. Partial or incomplete homes, as of January 1 of the tax year, will not be given the 
residential exemption until the following year when the full market value is placed on 
the county tax assessment roll, a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the 
county, and the completed structure is occupied by a full time resident. It is the 
occupancy that qualifies the property for the exemption. 
F. To qualify for the residential exemption, a property need not be property owner 
occupied. Apartments and other rental housing used as a primary residence (property 
inhabitant) qualify for the residential exemption upon accepted application in 
accordance with Section 1 above and paragraph B of this Section. 
G. The residential exemption is limited to up to one acre of land per residential 
dwelling unit on a single property description. 
Section 3. Grandfather Provision, 
As of the effective date of this Ordinance, property owners whose Summit County 
property is currently listed by the County Assessor as having a residential exemption 
shall not be required to file an application and affidavit to continue its status. 
However, should ownership or the property inhabitant's status change, the property 
shall no longer be considered exempt and an application and affidavit under the 
provisions of this Ordinance shall apply. 
Section 4. Conflict. 
In the event of any conflict between this Ordinance and State or Federal law, the 
provisions of the latter shall be controlling. 
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Section 5. Savings Clause, 
In the event one or more of the provisions of this Ordinance shall, for any reason, be 
held to be unenforceable or invalid in any respect under any applicable laws, such 
unenforceability or invalidity shall not affect any other provision; and in such an 
event, this Ordinance shall be construed as if such unenforceable or invalid provision 
had never been contained herein. 
Section 6. Effective Date. 
This Ordinance shall become effective after publication of such in accordance with 
applicable State law. 
APPROVED, ADOPTED, AND PASSED and ordered published by the 
Summit County Board of Commissioners, this ZZ1^ day of5eqWSc<? 1997, 
Coiinty Clerk 
Summit County, Utah 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
By:ia^^Lj 
Chairman 
Commissioner Soter voted: 
Commissioner Richins voted: 
Commissioner Schifferli voted: 
JL 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
V^k A ^ ^ r W C^\^ c/fc*^ 
Deputy County Attorney 
Summit County, Utah 
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service member is stationed out of Utah, but the personal property remains in Utah, the property 
is not exempt from property tax. 
2.123 Personal Property of Non-Utah Residents Stationed in Utah. Personal property 
owned by non-Utah residents who are members of the armed forces and stationed under military 
orders in Utah is exempt from property tax. The assessor may rely on a letter from the 
commanding officer or other documentation verifying out-of-state residency and military orders 
assigning the service member to Utah. For example, if the non-Utah resident service member 
owned a non-commercial mobile home in Utah, the property would be exempt. (50 USC 574) 
Standard of Practice 2.13 
Primary Residential Exemption 
2.13.0 Primary Residential Exemption. Utah law requires assessors to exempt from 
taxation 45% of the fair market value of residential property. [Section 59-2-130(2)] Utah Code 
Annotated Section 59-2-102(22) and rule R884-24P-52 define residential property, for purposes 
of the exemption, to be a primary residence, A primary residence does not include property used 
for transient residential use, or condominiums used in rental pools. [Utah State Constitution, 
Article Xm, Section 2(8), (59-2-103)] 
To qualify-, a property need not be owner occupied. Apartments and other rental housing 
used as a primary residence qualify for the exemption. The assessor shall grant the residential 
exemption to the first one acre of land, if listed in the same parcel description. The property 
owner has the burden of proving that property qualifies for the exemption. 
Guidelines: 
• A "primary residence" is the principal place where one actually lives as 
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though motel and other 
transient properties would not meet this definition, typical student housing, used 
by renters during the school year (more than six months), would qualify for the 
exemption. 
• If a person requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the 
exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the property 
serves as the person's primary residence. If the person's address on the Utah 
driver's license and/or voter registration is in a county different from that of the 
property location address, the county where the application is made should notify 
the other county assessor. 
• Where a person or persons own more than one residence in Utah, none of which 
are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a primary 
residence. Only the residence which is occupied more than six months out of the 
year qualifies for the exemption. 
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• Married couples may only claim one property as a primary residence except where 
separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved 
separation agreement 
Further instruction has been provided by the Commission in an Advisory Opinion dated 
September 17,1997. This advisory opinion states: 
"Property that is eligible for the primary residential exemption on the lien date is entitled 
to the exemption, even if the property is temporarily unoccupied For example, assume that a 
home was sold prior to the lien and the seller moved out prior to the lien date. Assume also that 
the new owner does not move in until after January 1st. So long as the property use meets the 
criteria for the primary residential exemption, the fact that it was temporarily unoccupied on the 
January 1 st is irrelevant The situation may also arise with rental property that serves as the 
primary residence of the tenants. The fact that the property may be temporarily vacant on the lien 
date should not defeat the exemption. 
"Another example of a primary residential property that may be unoccupied on the lien 
date is a home under construction. It is our position that when property is committed to a. 
qualifying use, that property is eligible for the exemption if (1) the dwelling is under construction 
on the lien date, (2) the assessor has evidence that the house is being constructed for use as a 
qualifying residential dwelling, and (3) the property is actually put to use as a primary residential 
property upon completion during the tax year. If all of those conditions are met, the exemption 
relates back to the lien date. This is true even if the owner is living in another primary residence 
during construction. The primary exemption is based on the intended use of the two residences, 
not the occupants. 
"The only distinctions that we have drawn with regard to a property owner who owns two 
homes in Utah are as follows: 
"(1) If the property owner is a Utah resident, but neither of the homes is rented or 
leased for use as a primary residence of another party. We assume that the owner is using one 
home as a primary residence and the other as a secondary residence." 
"(2) If the property owner is not a Utah resident, but owns residential property in 
Utah, we assume that the owner is using the Utah property as secondary property unless the 
owner shows that it its being used as a primary residence." (Dennis v. Summit county, 933 P.2d 
387) 
Standard of Practice 2.14 
General Personal Property Exemptions 
2.14,0 General Exemptions. "Household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used 
exclusively by the owner at the owner's residence in maintaining a home for the owner and the 
owner's family are exempt from property taxation." [Section 59-2-1113 and Utah State 
Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2 (8)] 
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MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A E., INC., a Utah ] 
Corporation, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ' 
EQUALIZATION, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Case No. 
To the Utah State Tax Commission and the County Auditor of Summit County, State of 
Utah: 
Petitioner, A. E., Inc. a Utah corporation, hereby appeals from the inaction of the 
County Board of Equalization of Summit County, State of Utah, and respectfully shows: 
1. Petitioner is the owner of the following-described real property in Summit 
County, Utah: 
Unit 7, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. 
BEC 7); and 
Unit 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. BEC-8). 
2. Between 1992 and 1996, petitioner paid $70,182.79 excess real property taxes 
for respondent's failure to grant petitioner the residential exemption for the real property 
described above. 'A copy of the $70,182.79 annual analysis is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A". 
3. Respondent granted the residential exemption for the real properties in 1997. 
4. During 1992 through 1996, at all times, an individual residing on the property 
qualified the property for the residential exemption under Section 59-2-103 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
5. Respondent by its failure to act has denied petitioner the $70,182.79 refund for 
the years 1992 through 1996. Therefore, petitioner paid the taxes under protest, stating 
that the protest was because the property had not been given the benefit of the 
residential property tax exemption. 
6. Petitioner has made demand upon respondent for payment, but no payment 
has been made. Copies of the demand notices and the County's responses are attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays judgment against respondent in the amount of 
$70,182.79, interest, costs of court, and general relief. 
ItTH Juuy 
DATED this flP™ day of Jt»e9 1998. 
Milo S. MarsoenX Jr. I J 
MARSDEN(C£HOON, GOTTFREDSON 
& BELL, LLC. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Exhibit U^A 
EXHIBIT A 
WORKSHEET OF TAX DIFFERENCE 
(For Failure to Give Residential Exemption 
Under 5 59-2-103, Utah Code Annotated) 
1996 Unit 7 
1996 Unit 8 
$4,216,103 
644,000 
$48,240.65 
7,368.65 
x45% = $21,708.29 
x45% = 3,315.89 
1995 Unit 7 
1995 Unit 8 
3,488,103 
560,000 
44,333.79 
7,117.60 
x 45% = 19,950.21 
x45% = 3,202.92 
1994 Unit 7 
1994 Unit 8 
1,641,068 
393,750 
26,844.59 
6,440.96 
x32% = 8,590.27 
x32% = 2,061.11 
1993 Unit 7 
1993 Unit 8 
1,641,06s1* 
393,750* 
26,320.85 29.5-5=24.5% = 6,448.61 
6,315.34 29.5-5=24.5% = 1,547.26 
1992 Unit 7 443,750* 
1992 Unit 8 393,750* 
TOTAL2 
7,262.69 29.5-5=24.5% = 1,779.36 
6,444.38 29.5-5=24.5% = 1.578.87 
$70,182.79 
Taxabla valua for 1992 and 1993 was 95% of markat ralaa. 
f 55-2-103 
Spinning January 1, 1992, and arary yaar tharaaftar tha fair aaxkat raloa of 
raaidaatial proparty thall ba raducad by 29.301, rapratanting a raaidaatial 
axaaqption allowad undar artiela XIII, Sac. 2, Utah Constitution. 
••ginning January 1, 1994, and arary yaar tharaaftar tha fair aarkat valaa of 
raaidaatial proparty thall ba radacad by 32%, rapratanting a raaidaatial 
aaaaytlon allowad andar Artiola XIII, Sac. 2, Utah Constitution. 
••ginning Juna 1, 1993, tha fair markat valaa of ratidaatial proparty thall 
ba radacad by 43%,rapratanting a raaidaatial axaaption allowad andar Artiola 
C I I , Sac. 2, Otah Coattitution. 
Exhibit"_S 
EXHIBIT B 
MILO »• MAASOCM. J * . 
RICHAAO C. CAMOOM. P.C. 
j . MICMACU a o r r m c o s o N 
MAMK r m a i M U ) M U . 
LAW OFFICES 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & B E L L , L . I i . C . 
FIFTH FLOOR 
6 8 SOUTH MAIN 
S A L T L A X I CITT, U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 
(80I) 521-3800 
FAX (SOI) 537-1315 
o r couNscu 
• i^ INK O. W1LUAMS 
MO«CKT r. OUTON, m.c 
July 15, 1998 
Utah State Tax Commission 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134-6200 
Re: A, E., Inc,. vs. Summit County Board of Equalization 
Dear Commissioners: 
Enclosed please find a Notice of Appeal in the captioned 
matter. 
I would appreciate this being set for an initial hearing. 
If you have any questions, please give me a call. 
Very truly yours, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
MSM/gz 
Enclosure 
MEMO TO FILE 
To: 3742, A & E, Inc. 
From: MSM 
Date: December 19, 1997 
I met with Steve Martin at the Summit County Assessor's 
office in Coalville, Utah, December 16, 1997. We discussed the 
best way to qualify Bald Eagle Units 7 and 8, for property 
assessment purposes. I had computed with him earlier if it were 
one assessment notice rather than two, under the Summit County 
formula there would be an annual savings of over $10,000. He 
said the easiest way for him to be able to grant that type of 
assessment would be to have the Recorder's office include Units 7 
and 8 in one assessment and directed me next door Alan Sprigg, 
Summit County Recorder. I met with Alan Sprigg's assistant 
clerks and we reviewed the plat map. They then made the 
necessary changes on the computer. For the tax year 1998, there 
should be a single assessment. 
I then returned to Steve Martin's office and confirmed with 
him that the single assessment would be made beginning 1998. 
I then stepped down to the office of the Summit County Clerk 
and met with Kent Jones. He had on his desk the recent letter 
and exhibits that I had sent to Barbara Kresser. He said that he 
had discussed them with Dave Thomas, Deputy Summit County 
Attorney. Dave had asked him to check the Assessor's records to 
see if an appeal had been filed from the Board of Equalization 
decisions for the years 1992 through 1996. He had not yet done 
that. 
I believe he will find that there was an appeal each year 
and that the Assessor granted relief on market valuation but not 
on the primary/secondary classification issue. Accordingly, the 
tax was paid under protest. 
I need to research the legal issue as to what constitutes an 
appeal from the Board of Equalization. Does paying under protest 
constitute an appeal? Or must there be some more formal type of 
appeal? What are the time frames for taking the appeal? The 
initial valuation notice comes about September 1st. Does the 30-
day appeal right begin then? I believe the 30-day appeal right 
begins no earlier than the date the Board of Equalization renders 
its adverse decision. If it were otherwise, there could easily 
be more than 30 days between sending the September 1st valuation 
notice and the Board of Adjustment hearing. How can you appeal a 
Board of Adjustment decision until that decision has been made? 
MSM 
MEMO TO FILE 
To: 3742, A & E, Inc. 
From: MSM 
Date: December 9, 1997 
I spoke with Steve Martin December 5, 1997. He suggested I 
show him and the recorder a site map of the home on Lots 7 and 8. 
He will then approve the recorder and assessor giving a single 
serial number to the two-lot description. This should be an 
assessment savings of about $900,000. Using the 1997 tax rate of 
.011810, this would be an annual savings of $10,629. 
In computing the tax savings, I reviewed the tax notice. It 
lists the various tax rates for the various entities, and the 
total is .006492. It then shows a district tax rate of .011810. 
The difference is .005318. What is the explanation for the 
difference between the effective tax and the district tax rate? 
I talked to Steve Martin about this and we said we would 
discuss it next week when I got to Summit County for the lot line 
adjustment. 
MSM 
MEMO TO FILE 
To: 3742, A & E, Inc. 
From: MSM 
Date: November 20, 1997 
Re: Tax Refund File, 1992-1996 
I received a call from John Thomas, Assistant Summit County 
Attorney, November 19, 1997. 
We discussed the need for a final determination from the 
Board of Adjustment. Barbara Kresser should be able to do this. 
If she can't, call the Summit County Clerk for an agenda time. 
Dave Thomas said there should be a year-by-year 
determination by the Board of Equalization. 
MEMO TO FILE 
To: 3742, A & E, Inc. 
From: MSM 
Date: September 15, 1997 
I talked with Steve Martin September 13, 1997. I told him I 
had tried to reach the County offices on September 12, 1997, from 
3:00 until 4:45 and there was no answer. I had spoken with him 
about August 18th relative to the values of Bald Eagle lots 7 and 
8. 
He said the State had required them to re-examine unimproved 
lots and that he had made an analysis, and when the information 
went into the new computer program, it produced values higher 
than calculated. He did say, however, that on lots where there 
were improvements, the lot values were all right. Nevertheless, 
he said it appeared the lot values for Bald Eagle lots 7 and 8 is 
too high and that he would look at the increases and make an 
adjustment. He will call me about the adjustment amounts. 
We discussed the benefit of combining lots 7 and 8. He said 
th^y would then receive one lot value. It is a situation where 
th§ whole is not as valuable as its parts. Therefore, there is a 
tax benefit in combining the two lots. 
He referred me to the Summit County Recorder. I talked with 
Julie of that office, who is familiar with the procedures. She 
told me that I should contact the Park City Planning. I talked 
with Kirsten, who is very familiar with the procedure. She is 
sending me a packet. It requires the consent of the adjoining 
land owners. She will also enclose 3 small mylar drawing that an 
engineer will need to modify to show the combining of lots 7 and 
8. According to Kirsten, it is the recording of the mylar plat 
th&t effectuates the combining of the lots. It does not require 
a deed recording. She said that Summit County was instrumental 
in creating Section 17-27-808(6) which provides for petitions to 
adjust lot lines between adjacent properties. 
MSM 
MEMO TO FILE 
To: 3742, A & E, Inc. 
From: MSM 
Date: October 28, 1997 
I talked with Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor, 
October 27, 1997. She said that she entered office in 1991 and 
became aware of a problem or discrepancies between residential 
and non-residential classifications. When she sent out letters 
to home owners, all heck broke loose. As a result, the County 
Commission said they would go back five years, one time only, and 
make refunds upon proper proof. Barbara said she would send me a 
copy of the Summit County Commission resolution to that effect. 
She said she had no authority to say whether the 
administrative remedy was exhausted. She conferred with Dave 
Thomas, Assistant Summit County Attorney, and he told her she 
could not address that issue. His telephone number is 336-4451, 
ext. 3206. 
I received the resolution entitled, "A Resolution Setting 
Guidelines and Limitations on Property Tax Refunds to Qualified 
Primary Residential Taxpayers". Its authorization is based in 
Section 59-2-1321, Utah Code Annotated.1 
The refund by the County Treasurer is upon order of the 
County governing body. 
Read the following cases: Nielsen v. Sanpete County, 123 P. 
334, and Shea v. State Tax Commission, 120 P.2d, 274 (1941). 
The county resolution refers to refunds made of the 
difference between taxes actually paid at the secondary rate 
which should have been paid at the primary residential rate. 
Applications are only considered for partial refund of taxes paid 
during tax years 19Q7 through 1991. Our claim is for the tax 
years 1992 through 1996. The commission says that after August 
31, 1992, only current year applications will be accepted or 
processed. The resolution provides that refunds will not bear 
interest. 
i 
This Section 59-2-1321 it entitled "Erroneous or Illegal Asseaaraents-Deductions and Refunds." It 
provides that the county governing body, upon aufficient evidence that the property has been erroneously or 
illegally assessed may order the county treasurer to allow the taxes on that part of the property to be deducted 
before payment of taxes. Any taxes, interest, or costs paid more than once or erroneously or illegally 
collected, may be refunded by the county treaaurer. 
3742, Memo to File 
October 28, 1997 
Page 2 
Section, 59-2-1328, which is not in the resolution, provides 
for payment under protest—judgment for recovery—payment—tax 
levy. If it is determined in any action that a tax or any 
portion of the tax paid under protest was unlawfully collected, a 
judgment for recovery of the tax, plus interest, is provided by 
law, together with cost of action, shall be entered in favor of 
the taxpayer. 
Section 59-2-1330 provides for payment of property taxes— 
unlawful collection by county—liability of state or taxing 
entity—treatment of disputed taxes. If the commission or a 
court of competent jurisdiction orders a reduction in the amount 
of any tax levied against any property for tax purposes, the 
taxpayer shall be reimbursed. The state and any taxing entity 
which has received property taxes or any portion of property 
taxes is liable to the judgment debtor for the amount the state 
or the taxing entity received, plus interest, and for an 
equitable portion of the cost of action. 
MSM 
'-A*Y% 
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RESOLUTION NO. 
A RESOLUTION SETTING GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS OH PROPERTY 
TAX REFUNDS TO QUALIFIED PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL TAX PAYERS 
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has determined that 
equitable considerations require differential tax refunds to 
those certain tax payers who qualified for "primary residential 
exemption*", but who paid "secondary residential rate" taxes; 
and, 
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has further determined 
that such differential refunds should only be distributed within 
strict guidelines and to qualified tax payers only, 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED pursuant to the authorization 
of U.C.A. 59-2-1321, that the County Assessor and County 
Treasurer are hereby directed and authorised to sake differential 
refunds as follows: 
1. Refunds may be made of the difference between taxes 
actually paid at the secondary rate which should have been paid 
at the primary residential rate. 
2. Applications shall only be considered for such partial 
refund of taxes paid during tax years 1987 thru 1991 inclusive. 
Applications will only be accepted until 5x00 p.m. August 31, 
1992; thereafter only current year applications will be accepted 
or processed. 
3. Applications for refunds must be accompanied by 
satisfactory and verifiable proof of primary residency status 
during each year the refund is clalmtd. Such items as voter 
registrations, school registrations, state and federal income tax 
returns, drivers licenses, telephone and utility listings, etc. 
may be accepted as evidence of residency status. 
4. Applications for refunds will only be received or 
accepted from individual tax payers or the tax payer's attorney-
at-law or an attorney-in-fact possessing regularly executed and 
recorded general or special powers of attorney for the tax payer. 
5. Applications for refunds shall be made to the Assessor's 
Office. Any and all refunds shall be made as quickly as possible 
and shall not bear interest. 
6. Applicants who are denied refunds may appeal such denial 
to the Summit County Commission. 
PASSED AHD ADOPTED this 9^ day of June, 1992. 
SUHHEP COUNTY BOARD OP COMMISSION* 
I 
*L 
SHELDON D. RICHINS, CHAIRMAN 
RONALD A. 
y ^ ^ U ^ 
H. GENS MOSSR 
SUMMIT COUNTY CLERK 
Barbara J. Kresser 
Assessor 
1909 
SUMMIT COUNTY Cou»rr MOust 
August 14, 1997 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C. 
Fifth Floor ' 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Mr. Marsden: 
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to 
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald 
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8. 
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their 
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on 
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on 
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of 
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years. 
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the 
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be 
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year 
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria. 
Sincerely, 
Barbara J . 4(resser 
Summit County Assessor 
AUG J 8 1997 
P.O. BOX 128 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017 
October 21, 1991 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Glen G. Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of Property Taxes Under Protest 
A. E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Uno.t 8, the 
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a 
check in the amount of $26,320.85 in payment of the 199« property 
taxes for the property located at Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at 
Deer Valley, Utah. The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed 
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the 
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property 
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the 
county and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-
1327, 29.50% of the total 1993 taxes due are paid under protect. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
A. E. INC. 
a Utah Corporation 
s 
By . 
wenvn 
LAW OFFICES 
M A R S D E N , CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, L . L . C . 
FIFTH FLOOR 
MIWO a. MAASOCN. JH. ^ 3 SOUTH MAIN °*i***—*^ 
SAJLT LAJOB C I T Y . U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 
MARK rtTZOCMAtA »CLL ( 8 0 U 5 2 ! * 3 S O O *CNOCU. N. MABCY 
FAX 180I) 537-1315 
September 2, 1997 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Barbara J. Kresser, Assessor 
Summit County, State of Utah 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Dear Ms. Kresser: 
Thank you for your August 14, 1997 response to my April 24, 
1997 letter and my follow-up letter of July 17, 1997, Certified 
Mail, Return Receipt Requested. Copies of my earlier 
correspondence are attached as Exhibits MAH and MB". 
I understand that Summit County's position is that the 
primary exemption must be applied for. The taxpayer applied for 
the primary exemption. The application was denied, and the 
taxpayer paid the taxes at the non-primary rate under protest. 
The exemption for the year 1997 has been granted, and the 
1997 taxes will be paid at the primary resident rate. A copy of 
the 1997 primary exemption is attached as Exhibit "C". However, 
the taxpayer is entitled to the primary rate for the prior years 
paid under protest. 
Because the taxpayer has met Summit County's primary 
exemption application requirements, I would appreciate your 
reconsideration of this matter. 
I would be happy to meet in person with you or the Summit 
County Board of Commissioners to review the prior year 
applications, the correspondence and the payments made under 
protest in an effort to settle these pre-1997 tax claims. 
A copy of your August 14, 1997 letter is attached as Exhibit 
MDM. 
If we are not able to settle these pre-1997 tax claims, 
would you confirm that I have exhausted the administrative 
remedy. I will then file a complaint with the Third Judicial 
District Court, Summit County, Utah. 
MSM/gz (3 
Barbara J. Kresser 
Assessor 
1909 
SUMMIT COUNTY C O U « T House 
August 14, 1997 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C. 
Fifth Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Mr. Marsden: 
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to 
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald 
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8. 
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their 
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on 
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on 
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of 
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years. 
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the 
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be 
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year 
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria. 
Sincerely, 
Barbara J . d r e s s e r 
Summit County Assessor 
AUG J 8 S97 
P.O. BOX 128 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017 
MEMO TO FILE 
To: 3742, A & E, Inc. 
From: MSM 
Date: August 14, 1997 
I received a call from Kent Jones, Summit County Clerk, 
August 14, 1997. He said he has presented my letter and the 
accompanying documents to the Board of County Commissioners. Their 
official position is that they take no action. They say that they 
support the Summit County Assessor, that they will not open 
previous years. 
I r^jJorted that I had met with Steve Martin of the Summit 
County rtommiggifan'o office each year and filed a protest. He 
adjusted the valuation but did not give the residential 
classification. Each year the adjusted amount was paid under 
protest on the residency issue. Ultimately, in 1997, the Assessor 
has recognized the residency classification. I am now seeking to 
apply •&£-residency qualification to the prior years. 
Kent Jones said he would cause a letter to be sent to me 
stating that the Summit County Commission takes no action. He said 
the letter may come from the Summit County Assessor. I told Kent 
Jones I need the letter to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies prior to filing a complaint in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Summit County, State of Utah. 
MSM 
Ml CO S. MAASOCM. J *. 
RICHAAO C. CAHOON. » C 
j . MICHAEL ocrrmto%OH 
MAAK riTZOCAACO BCLL 
LAW O F F I C E S 
M A R S D E N , CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & B E L L , I i - L . C . 
FIFTH FLOOR 
6 8 SOUTH MAIN 
SAI-T LAKJB CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 
(SOU 521-3800 
FAX (80I) 537-1315 
OTCOUMSCL; 
auMNC a WIUJAMS 
noscirr r. OUTON. P.C 
fttMOCU. M. MABCY 
July 17, 1997 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Summit County Commission 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Re: Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8 
Dear Commission Members: 
On April 24, 1997, I wrote you concerning the captioned 
matter. A copy of that letter and attachments thereto are 
enclosed. 
I have called 801-336-4451, Ext. 3, on many occasions. I did 
receive a call back from Kent Jones on June 25 1997 "-ponding to 
a call I placed to the Commission June 17, 1997. I have also 
called Anita Lewis and left messages. 
I would appreciate a reply to my April 24, 1997 letter. 
Very truly yours, 
Milo S. 
MSM/az 
> 
£ 
c 
o 
1 
"a 
8 
SENDER;. 
•Complete items 1 anoVor 2 for additional services. 
• Complete items 3, 4a, and 4b. 
• Print your name and address on tne mvn% of this form so that we can return this 
card to you. 
•Attach this form to the front of the mailpiece, or on the back if space does not 
permit. 
•Write 'ftarum flecevpf fteQuesteo" on the mailpiece below the article number. 
•The Return Receipt wil show to whom the article was delivered and the date 
delivered. 
3. Article Addressed to: 
Summit County Commission 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
23 
§ i' Received By: (Print Name) 
6. Signature: (A&fcg** or Agent) 
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0» 
S 
3 
i i 
>» 
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4a. Article Number 
Z 735 268 516 
4b. Service Type 
• Registered [ J Certified 
D Express Mail • Insured 
D Return Receipt for Merchanol se D COD 
7. Date of Delivery 
8. Addressee's Aodr+ts (Only it requested 
and fee is pajcfc t • $ * \ \ 
\«\ <§y ^ 'oJ 
MILO S. MAASOCN. JM. 
niCMAito a CAXOO*. * c -
j . MICHAEL «OTTTWCO»OW 
MAMK riTXOC^AUO •CUU 
LAW OFFICES 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFRBDSON & BELL, L X . C . 
FIFTH FLOOR 
6 8 SOUTH MAIN 
SA1VT LAKX CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 
I80U 521-3800 
FAX (80I) 537-1315 
o r OOUNSKL.' 
• I A J M C a W1LUAM9 
noscirr r. oirroH. P.C. 
RCMOCU. N. MASCT 
July 17, 1997 
rgpTTFTED MAIL 
Summit County Commission 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Re: Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8 
Dear Commission Members: 
^ nr^i -ii 1997 I wrote you concerning the captioned 
M t t « ? PA copy' of that letter ^ nd attachments thereto are 
enclosed. 
I have called 801-336-4451, Ext. 3, on ^ J ^ ™ ^ ^ 
receive a call back from Kent Jones on J™*25'™*1 ^ C v e also 
a call I placed to the Commission June 17, 1997. i 
called Anita Lewis and left messages. 
I would appreciate a reply to my April 24, 1997 letter. 
Very truly yours, 
Z 735 5bfl Sid 
Receipt for 
Certified Mail 
No Insurance Coverage Provided 
Do not use for International Mail 
(See Reverse) 
M i l o S, 
CO 
o> 
o> 
8 
6 
o 
8 
S6Sttmmit County Commiss ion 
Streat and No 
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P
°doalTi¥le, UT 84017 
Postage 
Certified Fee 
Special Delivery Fee 
Restricted Del/very Fee 
Return Receipt Showing 
to Whom A Date Oetrvered 
Return Receipt Showing to Whom, 
Date, and Addressee's Address 
TOTAL Postage 
ftFees 
Postmark or Date 
LAW OFFICES 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & B E L L , L . L . C . 
FIFTH FLOOR 
Miios.MAASocN.jM. 6 8 S O U T H M A I N OTCOUNSCL: 
"
C K M D f t C A H O O K P
-
f t
 S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 .UMNCaWILUAM* 
J.MICMACLOOTTTfttDSON * » ~ * * * * ~ « — 9 ~***MM, o^*v i . ftOSCftT W, OftTOW. * C 
MAftK rrrzocftALO scu. (801) 5 2 1 - 3 8 0 0
 M M O ^ M. MA^V 
FAX (80I ) 537-1315 
April 24, 1997 
Summit County Commission 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Re: Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8 
Dear Commission Members: 
I represent A.E. Inc., a Utah corporation, which has paid taxes under protest since 
1992 for failure of the Summit County Assessor to grant the residential 45% reduction 
exemption allowed by Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and implemented by the 
Utah Legislature as § 59-2-103. 
A copy of the 1997 Assessor's letter granting the exemption is enclosed. 
I am enclosing copies of the 1992 - 1996 property tax notices. All payments were 
made in full under protest by certified mail, return receipt requested. I am also enclosing 
the worksheet of the tax difference, $70,182.79. 
It is respectfully requested that you grant the refund because the properties should 
have received the primary residential reduction, but due to the Assessor's error in 
classification, it was not granted. Therefore, it should be refunded at this time. 
If you have any questions, please give me a call. 
Very truly yours, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
MSM/gz 
Enclosures 
MEMO TO FILE 
To: 3742, A. E., Inc. 
From: MSM 
Date: April 22, 1997 
I received a call from Steve Martin in response to my call and letter of March 12, 
1997. He said that property is now qualified for the 45% tax reduction for the year 1997. 
There is no question that Bret Anderson qualifies the home for the residency tax break. 
That is the good news. 
The bad news is that the Assessor cannot make any reimbursement. He says that 
approval for reimbursement must come from the Summit County Commission. Bret 
Anderson has lived on the property since November, 1992. The taxes were paid under 
protest. This should allow us direct access to the Third Judicial District Court, Summit 
County, Utah; however it would be prudent to exhaust the administrative remedy and 
request the refund from the Summit County Commission. 
I will calculate the amount of refund request for two months from November, 1992, 
and tax years 1993,1994,1995, and 1996. There were substantial adjustments during some 
of those years as to the assessment valuation. 
We were awaiting the outcome of the case before the Third Judicial District Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court appeal, which is adverse to out-of-state property owners who 
have second homes in Utah which do not qualify as primary residencies. During the course 
of that action, upon reading the depositions of the Summit County Assessor, I then 
understood that although Jeffrey Katzenburg did not qualify as a Utah resident, that Bret 
Anderson did, and that Bret Anderson's residency qualified the home, although he is not the 
owner. 
Calculate the amount of refund and get approval to pursue the matter. 
Summit County has won the main battle with out-of-state owners and preserved the 
$37 million at issue. Our situation will be a very limited situation and should not meet with 
nearly as much resistance from the Summit County Commission. 
Steve Martin said he would write me a letter confirming the Summit County 
Assessor's position and response to my March 12, 1997 letter. 
MSM 
Barbara J. 
Assessor 
er 
S U M M I T COUNTY C O U H T M O U » * 
MiloMarsden 
Fifth Floor 
68 South main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: Primary Resident status on lots 7 & 8, Bald Eagle Club @ Deer Valley 
Dear Mr. Marsden; 
Pursuant to our conversation of April 17,1997,1 will change the status of these two 
properties to Primary Residential based on the approved applications you submitted on February 
3,1997. The current reduction in assessed value is 45% at the writing of this letter. 
The power to grant refunds based on the change in status for years previous to the current 
tax year does not rest with the Assessor. The Assessor can make changes in value for the current 
tax year (1997) only. All other matters of tax dollars, errors etc. are dealt with by the County 
Commissioners. It is my understanding that they would be reticent to grant refunds for prior years 
if the taxpayer had not filed their exemption application at some point in the past nor corrected 
the error through the Board of Equalization during the years in question. 
Sr. Staff Appraiser 
Summit County Assesor's Office 
PO. BOX 128 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017 
RECEIVE* 
APR 21 m 
October 31, 1996 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Glen C Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A. EL, Ino, a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer 
Valley. The corporation is sending you a check in the amount of $40,872.00 in payment of 
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Chib at Deer Valley 
Utah. The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are 
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the 
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county 
and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the 
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest. 
Sincerely, 
A- E, INC 
a Utah Corporation 
By 
October 31,1996 
CERTfflEP MAIL 
Glen C Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalvffle, UT 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A. IL, Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 8, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer 
Valley. The corporation is sending you a check in the amount of $7,368.65 in payment of 
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley 
Utah. The account number is 0266126. 
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are 
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the 
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county 
and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the 
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest 
Sincerely, 
A R, INC 
a Utah Corporation 
By 
October 31, 1995 
ggRTIf IBP HTO 
Glen C. Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
C o a l v i l l e , OT 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 19*5 Property Taxes Under Protes t 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A. B . , I n c . , a Utah corporation, i s the owner of Unit 8, The 
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation i s sending you a 
check in the amount of $7,117.60 in payment of the 1995 property 
taxes on the property known as Unit 8, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer 
Val ley Utah, The account number i s 0266126. 
The corporation bel ieves that 45% of the taxes assessed 
against t h i s parce l are unlawful and unconstitutional because the 
property has not been given the benef i t of the r e s i d e n t i a l property 
tax exemption that i s given to other res ident ial property in the 
county and s t a t e . 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-
1327, 45% of the t o t a l 1995 taxes due are paid under protes t . 
Sincerely, 
A. E. INC. 
a Utah Corporation 
By 
October 31, 1995 
CgRTtFIBP Will 
Glen C. Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, DT 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1995 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A. E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The 
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a 
check in the amount of $44,333.79 in payment of the 1995 property 
taxes on the property known as Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer 
Valley Utah, The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 45% of the taxes assessed 
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the 
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property 
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the 
county and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-
1327, 45% of the total 1995 taxes due are paid under protest. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
A. E. INC. 
a Utah Corporation 
By 
October 31, 1994 
CERTIFIBD MAIL 
Glen C. Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1994 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A.E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The 
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a 
check in the amount of $26,844.59 in payment of the 1994 property 
taxes on the property known as Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer 
Valley Utah. The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed 
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the 
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property 
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the 
county and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-
1327, 29.50% of the total 1994 taxes due are paid under protest. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
A . E . , Inc . 
a Utah Corporation 
October 31, 1994 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Glen C. Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1994 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A.E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 8, The 
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a 
check in the amount of $6,440.96 in payment of the 1994 property 
taxes on the property known as Unit 8, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer 
Valley Utah. The account number is 0266126. 
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed 
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the 
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property 
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the 
county and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-
1327, 29.50% of the total 1994 taxes due are paid under protest. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
A . E . , Inc . 
a Utah Corporation 
By 
October 21, 1993 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Glen G. Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1993 Property Taxes Under Protest 
A. E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 8, the 
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a 
check in the amount of $26,320.85 in payment of the 1993 property 
taxes for the property located at Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at 
Deer Valley, Utah. The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed 
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the 
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property 
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the 
county and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-
1327, 29.50% of the total 1993 taxes due are paid under protect. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
A. E. INC. 
a Utah Corporation 
Tab 13 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
David L. Thomas, #7106 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorneys for Summit County 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.E., INC., 
VS. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD 
OF EQUALIZATION, 
DEFENDANT. 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SAID MOTION AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION REGARDING 
JURISDICTION 
Case No. 99-0257 
(The Honorable Jane Phan) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, the Summit County Board of Equalization, by and 
through its counsel of record, and moves the Utah State Tax Commission to dismiss Plaintiffs 
Appeal and submits the foregoing Memorandum in Support of said Motion to Dismiss and in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction. 
RECEIVED 
JUL 1 9 \m 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is an owner of real property in Summit County, Utah. (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, pp. 1, para. 3). 
2. Plaintiff filed a letter with the Summit County Treasurer in each tax year, 1993 -
1996, asserting payment of property taxes under protest. (Plaintiffs Exhibit A). 
3. Plaintiff claims that he should have been given a residential property tax exemption 
for the subject real property. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 2-3, Summary of Facts). 
4. Plaintiff never filed an application or affidavit for a residential property tax exemption 
with Summit County, as required by Utah Code Ann. Title 59, Part 11, nor did Plaintiff ever 
provide any evidence that he qualified for the residential property tax exemption during tax years 
1992 - 1996. (Summit County Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Barbara J. Kresser, County Assessor). 
5. Summit County enacted a Resolution, dated June 9, 1992, which allowed tax refunds 
to property owners who had inadvertently failed to file an appropriate application for residential 
property tax exemption with Summit County, so long as adequate evidence of primary residential 
status was supplied to the County. This was passed as a one-time tax amnesty for prior tax 
years 1987-1991. Thereafter, the Board of Commissioners made known that it would no longer 
accept late applications for residential property tax exemptions. (Summit County Exhibit 2, 
Resolution, dated June 9, 1992). 
6. Summit County enacted Ordinance 319, on September 22, 1997, which adopted in 
more detail the guidance on residential property tax exemptions provided by the Utah State Tax 
2 
Commission. Ordinance 319 also reaffirmed the Board of Commissioner's position that a 
property owner must apply for a residential property tax exemption and carry the burden of 
proof in showing primary residential status. (Summit County Exhibit 3, Summit County 
Ordinance 319). 
7. On February 3, 1997, Plaintiff submitted an application for residential property tax 
exemption to Summit County. Thereafter, on April 17, 1997, Plaintiff was granted residential 
property tax exempt status for tax year 1997 and thereafter. (Summit County Exhibit 4, Letter 
of Steve Martin, Sr. Staff Appraiser). 
8. On August 14, 1997, the Board of Commissioners, sitting as the Board of 
Equalization, denied Plaintiffs request for a property tax refund for tax years 1992 - 1996, 
citing the failure of Plaintiff to properly request a residential property tax exemption in each of 
those years. (Summit County Exhibit 5, Letter of Barbara J. Kresser, County Assessor). 
9. Nearly a year later, on July 16, 1998, Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Utah 
State Tax Commission. (See Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal). 
ARGUMENT 
U.C.A. Title 59, Part 11, governs the issuance of property tax exemptions. It requires 
that 
[t]he owner who receives exempt status for property, if required 
by the commission, shall file an affidavit, on or before March 1 
each year, certifying the use to which the property has been placed 
during the past year. The affidavit shall contain the following 
information in summary form: 
3 
(i) identity of affiant; 
(ii) the basis of the affiant's knowledge of the use 
of the property; 
(iii) authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the 
owner; 
(iv) county where property is located; and 
(v) nature of use of the property. 
U.C.A. 59-2-1101(3)(a). The Tax Commission has required such an affidavit by rule. (Summit 
County Exhibit 6, Utah State Tax Commission, Property Tax Administration Standards of 
Practice [hereinafter, "Standard of Practice"], Standard of Practice #2.13 (June 1999)). See also 
R884-24P-35 (Annual Affidavit of Exempt Use); R884-24P-52 (Definition of Primary 
Residence). Summit County has adopted similar rules. (See Summit County Exhibits 2 & 3). 
This is consistent with U.C.A. 59-2-1102 wherein the legislature set forth a statutory process 
for determination of property tax exemptions. The burden is clearly placed upon the property 
owner to prove to the Board of Equalization that the criteria for the exemption is established. 
An application, verified by oath, is a requirement. U.C.A. 59-2-1102(3); Standard of Practice 
II. 1, General Information. 
Appeals from decisions of the Board of Equalization on property tax exemption matters 
must be filed with the Utah State Tax Commission within thirty (30) days. U.C.A. 59-2-
1102(7); 59-2-1006(1). There is no statutory provision allowing waiver of this thirty (30) day 
statute of limitations for appeals. 
In the case sub judice, Plaintiff did not appeal the decision of the Summit County Board 
of Equalization within thirty (30) days to the Utah State Tax Commission. Instead, Plaintiff 
4 
waited nearly one (1) year. Consequently, this Commission does not have jurisdiction over this 
matter, as it is time-barred. 
Additionally, Plaintiff is time-barred by operation of law in that he failed to apply for the 
property tax exemption in each, or for that matter any, of the taxable years 1992 - 1996. The 
payment under protest provisions of the Utah Tax Code are inapplicable to property tax 
exemptions. The clear intent of the legislature is that one must file an application and prove the 
exemption before it can be received. Merely asserting under protest a property tax exemption 
is not within the intent or plain language of the statute. In fact, to allow such would frustrate 
Utah Tax Law by allowing individuals to avoid the statutory and regulatory application process 
for determinations of property tax exempt status.1 
1
 Plaintiff has asserted that he is allowed to pay under 
protest in accordance with U.C.A. 59-2-1328. However, U.C.A. 59-2-
1327 limits such to allegations of unlawful taxation. Where an 
individual taxpayer has not applied for a tax exemption, it can 
hardly be asserted that the tax is unlawful. The proper tax 
status does not change until an exemption is granted.t Furthermore, 
the statute of limitations on payments under protest is four (4) 
years, making Plaintiff's own argument for tax years 1992 - 1995 
moot. Stevensen v. Monson, 856 P. 2d 355 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); U.C.A. 78-12-25. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Summit County Board of Equalization requests that the 
Utah State Tax Commission dismiss Plaintiffs Appeal as being time-barred. 
DATED this V^day of July, 1999. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
Summit County Attorney 
DAVID L. THOMAS 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this f°i day of , 1999,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Said Motion 
and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction to be sent via United States 
mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
'j??/?^ (/ l/rf//J{(%S\ 
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pxhibif 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
David L. Thomas, #7106 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorneys for Summit County 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.E..INC, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
BARBARA J. KRESSER 
PLAINTIFF, : 
VS. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD Case No. 99-0257 
OF EQUALIZATION, : (The Honorable Jane Phan) 
DEFENDANT. 
I, Barbara J. Kresser, being duly sworn, state that I am the County Assessor, Summit 
County, State of Utah. I have acted in this capacity since January 7, 1991. 
l 
1. It is my official public duty to keep the records regarding property tax exemptions for 
Summit County, which includes all property tax exemption applications and affidavits. All 
property tax exemption applications and affidavits are promptly filed after receipt. All 
property tax exemption applications and affidavits are acted upon by the County Assessor and 
Board of Equalization in a timely manner during the regular course of official public duties 
as proscribed by statute and the rules of the Utah State Tax Commission. The documentation 
of such actions constitute official acts of the Board of Equalization and carries the force of 
law within Summit County. 
2. All original property tax exemption applications and affidavits are kept as official public 
records of the County under U.C.A., Sections 78-25-3 and 78-25-4, and as such, are open to 
public inspection. 
3. As the County Assessor, I am the official custodian of all property tax exemption 
documents, to include all applications and affidavits for property tax exempt status, and have 
personal knowledge of all official acts of the Board of Equalization. 
4. I certify that I have researched all records in the County Assessor's Office pertaining to 
Units 7 & 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No.s BEC-7 & BEC-8), which are 
the subject of this Appeal, and can find no record of an application or affidavit for a 
2 
residential property tax exemption being filed in tax years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, or 1996. 
In fact, the first evidence of such an application or affidavit being filed with the County 
Assessor is in February 1997. 
5. I have had several opportunities to communicate with Plaintiff concerning the matter 
which has been appealed. On August 11, 1997, the Summit County Board of Equalization 
denied Plaintiffs request for a property tax fund for tax years 1992 - 1996 because Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the statutory and Utah State Tax Commission Standards of Practice in 
failing to properly applied for a residential property tax exemption during those taxable 
years. This has been explained repeatedly to Plaintiff by Summit County. 
3 
I declare, under penalty of perjury, that I am the below named person and that the 
foregoing information and facts as described in this document are true, complete and correct 
to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
Date 
Q&AJ^OSl+^r h BARBARA /. KRESSER 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
Summit County ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by BARBARA J. KRESSER on t h i s / ^ day of s ri  
Jq/i, V- , 1999. 
f< ' Public T 
IONN1E A. DAWSON I 
60 U. Mat. P.O. Box 12b i 
Coatv; le, Utah 64017 J 
My Commission Expire* • 
December 18, 200C I 
ls77?s7// '/fame? 
State «f Uttfi J 
Ldnnie A. Dawson 
Notary Public in and for the State 
of Utah 
Residing in Coalville, Utah 
My commission expires: /£~/%~dJ(D 
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RESOLUTION NO, 
A RESOLUTION SETTING GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS ON PROPERTY 
TAX REFUNDS TO QUALIFIED PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL TAX PAYERS 
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has determined that 
equitable considerations require differential tax refunds to 
those certain tax payers who qualified for "primary residential 
exemptions", but who paid "secondary residential rate" taxes; 
and, 
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has further determined 
that such differential refun'ds should only be distributed within 
strict guidelines and to qualified tax payers only, 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED pursuant to the authorization 
of U.C.A. 59-2-1321, that the County Assessor and County 
Treasurer are hereby directed and authorized to make differential 
refunds as follows: 
1. Refunds may be made of the difference between taxes 
actually paid at the secondary rate which should have been paid 
at the primary residential rate. 
2. Applications shall only be considered for such partial 
refund of taxes paid during tax years 1987 thru 1991 inclusive. 
Applications will only be accepted until 5:00 p.m. August 31, 
1992; thereafter only current year applications will be accepted 
or processed. 
3. Applications for refunds must be accompanied by 
satisfactory and verifiable proof of primary residency status 
during each year the refund is claimed. Such items as voter 
registrations, school registrations, state and federal income tax 
returns, drivers licenses, telephone and utility listings, etc. 
may be accepted as evidence of residency status. 
4. Applications for refunds will only be received or 
accepted from individual tax payers or the tax payer's attorney-
at-law or an attorney-in-fact possessing regularly executed and 
recorded general or special powers of attorney for the tax payer. 
5. Applications for refunds shall be made to the Assessor's 
Office. Any and all refunds shall be made as quickly as possible 
and shall not bear interest. 
6. Applicants who are denied refunds may appeal such denial 
to the Summit County Commission. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED this V* day of June, 1992. 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSION: 
Exhibit B _ J : 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
ORDINANCE NO. 3 \ S 
AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR A PROCEDURE 
'AND CRITERIA IN GRANTING RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS 
PREAMBLE 
WHEREAS, the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2(8), and U.C.A. 59-2-
102(22) & 103(2) (1953), as amended, provide that a "residential exemption" to property tax 
of 45% is available for "primary residences;" and, 
WHEREAS, neither the State Code, nor Utah State Tax Commission rules, provide a 
definition of "primary residence," except to state that a "transient residential use or 
condominiums used in rental pools" are not considered primary residences; and, 
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, discusses property tax 
exemptions in general, but is silent as to the "residential exemption;" and, 
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, provides for an exemption 
application process, which includes the filing of an affidavit, prior to the granting of a 
property tax exemption; and, 
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1101(4) & 1102(1) state that "[t]he county legislative body 
may adopt rules to effecuiate the exemptions provided" and may "determine whether certain 
property within the county is exempt from taxation;" and, 
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1001 stditts that the County "may make and enforce any 
rule which is consistent with statute and commission rule, and necessary for the government 
of the [B]oard [of Equalization], the preservation of order and the transaction of business;" 
and, 
WHEREAS, in recognition of the diverse varieties of property ownership in Summit 
County a proper procedure for granting "residential exemptions" and defining the criteria 
allowing for such grants needs to be established; and, 
WHEREAS, it is the opinion of the County Commission that residency should be 
determined by the quality and quantity of the actual occupancy and not by the class of 
structure, nor the intended use of the structure; and, 
1 
WHEREAS, providing for a standardized procedure and criteria to grant "residential 
exemptions" to property tax, where the State Code and State Tax Commission are silent, is 
in the best interests of Summit County; 
NOW THEREFORE, the County Legislative Body of the County of Summit, the 
State of Utah, ordains as follows: 
Section 1. Procedure. 
A. A property owner or his/her designee (applicant) shall submit an application for 
residential exemption from property taxes to the Summit County Assessor no latter 
than May 22 of the current tax year. An application shall be in the form of an 
affidavit and shall contain, at a minimum, the following information: 
(1) property identification (serial number, address, etc.), 
(2) identity of the applicant/affiant, 
(3) basis of the applicant/affiant's knowledge of the use of the property; 
(4) authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the owner (if applicable), 
(5) county where property is located, and 
(6) nature of use of the property. 
B. In the event that an affidavit is not timely filed, an exemption may be granted by 
the Board of Equalization on an individual appeal basis for the current tax year only. 
At the close of the Board of Equalization, no further appeals for exemptions will be 
considered until the following tax year. 
C. A new affidavit of primary residence must be filed when ownership or the status 
of habitancy changes. Any misrepresentation on the affidavit subjects the owner to a 
penalty equal to the tax on the property's value. 
D. Submission of the affidavit authorizes the Summit County Assessor to request or 
collect information sufficient to verify primary residence status. 
E. If an applicant requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the 
residential exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the 
property serves as a primary residence. The burden of proof shall remain at all times 
with the applicant. 
Section 2. Criteria. 
A. A primary residence is the principal place where one (property owner or 
inhabitant) actually lives as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though 
motels and other transient properties would not meet this definition, rentals (on a 
yearly basis) would qualify for the residential property tax exemption. 
2 
B. A primary residence shall be defined by the following factors with respect to the 
property owner / property inhabitant (claimant): 
(1) an approved application for residential exemption, 
(2) the presence of the claimant on the voter registry in the area claimed as 
a primary residence, 
(3) the length of continuous residency in the place claimed as a primary 
residence, 
(4) the nature and quality of the living accommodations at the claimed 
primary residence, 
(5) the presence of family members at the claimed primary residence, 
(6) the place of residence of the claimant's spouse, 
(7) the physical location of the claimant's place of business or sources of 
income, 
(8) the physical location of the claimant's banking facilities, 
(9) the location of registration of claimant's vehicles, boats, and RVs, 
(10) claimant's membership in clubs, churches, and other social 
organizations; 
(11) the claimant's addresses used on such things as: 
(a) telephone listings, 
(b) mail, 
(c) state and federal tax returns, 
(d) listings in official government publications or other 
correspondence, 
(e) driver's license, 
(f) voter registration, and 
(g) tax rolls, 
(12) the location of public schools attended by the claimant or his/her 
dependents, 
(13) the nature and payment of taxes in other states, 
(14) declarations of the claimant: 
(a) communicated to third parties, 
(b) contained in deeds, 
(c) contained in insurance policies, 
(d) contained in wills, 
(e) contained in letters, 
(f) contained in registers, 
(g) contained in mortgages, and 
(h) contained in leases, 
(15) the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location, 
(16) the failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a 
resident of the area, 
(17) the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location, and 
(18) the acquisition of a new residence in a different location. 
3 
C. Where a property owner owns more than one residence in Utah, or elsewhere, 
none of which are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a 
primary residence for purposes of the residential property tax exemption. Only the 
residence which is occupied more than six months out of the year qualifies for the 
residential exemption. 
D. Married couples may only claim one property as a primary residence except 
where separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved 
separation agreement. 
E. Partial or incomplete homes, as of January 1 of the tax year, will not be given the 
residential exemption until the following year when the full market value is placed on 
the county tax assessment roll, a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the 
county, and the completed structure is occupied by a full time resident. It is the 
occupancy that qualifies the property for the exemption. 
F. To qualify for the residential exemption, a property need not be property owner 
occupied. Apartments and other rental housing used as a primary residence (property 
inhabitant) qualify for the residential exemption upon accepted application in 
accordance with Section 1 above and paragraph B of this Section. 
G. The residential exemption is limited to up to one acre of land per residential 
dwelling unit on a single property description. 
Section 3. Grandfather Provision. 
As of the effective date of this Ordinance, property owners whose Summit County 
property is currently listed by the County Assessor as having a residential exemption 
shall not be required to file an application and affidavit to continue its status. 
However, should ownership or the property inhabitant's status change, the property 
shall no longer be considered exempt and an application and affidavit under the 
provisions of this Ordinance shall apply. 
Section 4. Conflict, 
In the event of any conflict between this Ordinance and State or Federal law, the 
provisions of the latter shall be controlling. 
4 
Section 5. Savings Clause. 
In the event one or more of the provisions of this Ordinance shall, for any reason, be 
held to be unenforceable or invalid in any respect under any applicable laws, such 
unenforceability or invalidity shall not affect any other provision; and in such an 
event, this Ordinance shall be construed as if such unenforceable or invalid provision 
had never beeft contained herein. 
Section 6. Effective Date. 
This Ordinance shall become effective after publication of such in accordance with 
applicable State law. 
APPROVED, ADOPTED, AND PASSED and ordered published by the 
Summit County Board of Commissioners, this 22^ day of5gnWSc*r 1997. 
BOARDbF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Coiinty Clerk 
Summit County, Utah 
Chairman 
Commissioner Soter voted: 
Commissioner Richins voted: 
Commissioner Schifferli voted: 4^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Deputy County Attorney 
Summit County, Utah 
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MiloMarsden 
Fifth Roor 
68 South main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: Primary Resident status on lots 7 & 8, Bald Eagle Club @ Deer Valley 
Dear Mr. Marsden; 
Pursuant to our conversation of April 17,1997,1 will change the status of these two 
properties to Primary Residential based on the approved applications you submitted on February 
3,1997. The current reduction in assessed value is 45% at the writing of this letter. 
The power to grant refunds based on the change in status for years previous to the current 
tax year does not rest with the Assessor. The Assessor can make changes in value for the current 
tax year (1997) only. All other matters of tax dollars, errors etc. are dealt with by the County 
Commissioners. It is my understanding that they would be reticent to grant refunds for prior years 
if the taxpayer had not filed their exemption application at some point in the past nor corrected 
the error through the Board of Equalization during the years in question. 
Si Staff Appraise^  
Summit County AssesotJ i Uthce 
Exhibit" 
service member is stationed out of I lull, bit! llif pasniiu] | n opr ii\ mina i, I he propeii »' 
is not exempt from property tax. 
2.123 Personal Property of Non-Utah Residents Stationed in Utah. Personal property 
owned by non-Utah residents who are members of the armed forces and stationed under military 
orders in Utah is exempt from property tax. The assessor may rely on a letter from the 
commanding officer or other documentation verifying out-of-state residency and military orders 
assigning the service member to Utah. For example, if the non-Utah resident service member 
owned a non-commercial mobile home in Utah, the property would be exempt. (50 USC 574) 
Standard of Practice 2.13 
Primary Residential Exemption 
2.13.0 Primary Residential Exemption. Utah law requires assessors to exempt from 
taxation 45% of the fair market value of residential property. [Section 59-2-130(2)] Utah Code 
Annotated Section 59-2-102(22) and rule R884-24P-52 define residential property, for purposes 
of the exemption, to be a primary residence. A primary residence does not include property used 
for transient residential use, or condominiums used in rental pools. [Utah State Constitution, 
Article XIII, Section 2(8), (59-2-103)] 
Io qualify, a property7 need not be owner occupied. Apartments and other rental housing 
used as a primary residence qualify for the exemption. The assessor shall grant the residential 
exemption to the first one acre of land, if listed in the same parcel description. The property 
owner has the burden of proving that property qualifies for the exemption, 
Guideli nes: 
• A "primary residence" is the principal place where one actually lives as 
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though motel and other 
transient properties would not meet this definition, typical student housing, used 
by renters during the school year (more than six months), would qualify for the 
exemption. 
• If a person requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the 
exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the property 
serves as the person's primary residence. If the person's address on the Utah 
driver's license and/or voter registration is in a county different from that of the 
property location address, the county wn :. the application is made should notify 
the other county assessor. 
• Where a person or persons own more than one residence in 'Utah, none of which 
are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a primary 
residence. Only 'the residence which is occupied more than six months out of the 
year qualifies for the exemption. 
Barbara J-Kreiser 
( 9 0 9 
S U M M I T COUNTY COUWT House 
August 14, 1997 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C. 
Fifth Floor • 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah B4101 
Dear Mr. Marsden: 
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to 
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald 
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8. 
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their 
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on 
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on 
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of 
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years. 
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the 
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be 
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year 
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria. 
Sincerely, 
Barbara J . d r e s s e r 
Summit County Assessor 
AUG 18 897 
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MILO •. MAJISOCM. -J*. 
RtCHAAO C CAMOOM, P.Z. 
j . MICMASU aorrmcoaoN 
MAAK rrrzocAALO acu. 
LAW orriccs 
MAHSDENI CAHOON, GOTTFRBDSON & BELL, L.L.C. 
rjFTH FLOOR 
ee SOUTH MAIN 
SAJLT LAKJD C I T Y , U T A H 8 4 1 0 1 
(80I) 521-3600 
FAX (80U 537-1315 
November 21 , 1997 
orcouaam: . 
MJUNC a wiuMaaj 
aoacarr r. oarTQat, ax. 
aCXOCU. N. MAftCY 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Barbara J. Kresser, Assessor 
Summit County, State of Utah 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Dear Ms. Kresseri 
This is a follow-up to our October 27, 1997 telephone 
conversation. 
I appreciate receiving a copy of the Summit County 
Commission's resolution entitled, HA Resolution Setting 
Guidelines and Limitations on Property Tax Refunds to Qualified 
Primary Residential Taxpayers." It is dated June 9, 1992. 
I also spoke with Dave Thomas concerning exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. 
What I need to know, is whether the Summit County Commission 
has made a final determination on my September 2, 1997 letter to 
you. Specifically, I would like to know if the Summit County 
Commission will grant my client, A.E., Inc., relief for failure 
to give residential exemption on Units 7 and 8, Bald Eagle Club 
at Deer Valley, for the years 1992 through 1996. Those taxes 
were paid under protest claiming the primary residential 
exemption. A work sheet of tax difference between the primary 
residential exemption and the secondary tax status is attched 
hereto and totals $70,182.79. 
I would appreciate a hearing before the Summit County 
Commission to get their final determination. 
PS Form 3 8 0 0 . 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A.E., INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 
SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Appeal No. 99-0257 
Judge: Phan 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 20,1999, Respondent filed in this matter a Motion to Dismiss on the basis 
that Petitioner failed to timely file its appeal before the State Tax Commission. Petitioner had 
submitted a Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction on July 9,1999, and submitted a Response to 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding 
Jurisdiction on August 9,1999. 
Petitioner owns real property in Summit County and for the years 1992 through 1996 
Petitioner was denied the primary residential exemption for such property. For each of these years 
Petitioner paid the tax with a letter stating that the payment was made under protest as Petitioner was 
entitled to the exemption. Petitioner did not file an affidavit, nor provide any evidence that it 
qualified for the residential property tax exemption. In addition. Petitioner apparently did not file 
an appeal of the exemption status with the Summit County Board of Equalization for the years in 
question. For the 1997 tax year Petitioner filed the appropriate application and affidavit and was 
granted the primary residential exemption. Petitioner then filed a refund request with the County for 
0089 
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the 1992 through 1996 tax years. According to Respondent's attorney the Summit County Board of 
Commissioners,, acting as the Board of Equalization, denied the request on August 14,1997. This 
denial was communicated to Petitioner by letter from Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor. 
Petitioner did not file an appeal of the decision to the State Tax Commission until July 1998. 
Petitioner argues that this is not an appeal from an adverse exemption ruling with the 
30 day limitation period allowed under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1102(7). Instead Petitioner indicates 
that this is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed which it paid under 
protest annually and Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to bring this action before the State Tax 
Commission under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1328l or §59-2-1321. 
The Tax Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal in either instance.2 
Petitioner did not comply with the administrative remedies of timely filing an appeal with the County 
Board of Equalization annually within thirty days from the date of the property tax notices and then 
timely filing an appeal annually with the State Tax Commission pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. 
1This provision does not support Petitioner's claim as it 
merely details how payment is to be made if a refund is ordered. 
It is presumably read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §59-2-
1327 which indicates the procedure for obtaining an order of 
refund. 
:See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n, 870 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah App. 1994). In Blaine Hudson the court stated, "A taxpayer 
faced with an allegedly erroneous assessment ordinarily has two 
statutory methods of challenging the ensuing tax. First, Utah 
Code Ann. §§59-2-1004, -1005 (1992) provide that the taxpayer can 
file an administrative appeal with the County Board of 
Equalization. Second, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301(1992) authorizes 
the taxpayer to pay under protest and seek to recover the tax 
paid in an action brought in district court." 
-2-
0083 
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§59-2-1006. Petitioner's appeal to the State Tax Commission nearly one year later is untimely. 
U{ah Code Ann. §59-2-1327 provides that a taxpayer who claims the tax is unlawful 
can pay the taxes under protest, as Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then file an action in 
district court. A similar remedy is provided in Utah Code Ann. §59-1-31)1, which again specifically 
states that the action is to be filed in district court. 
Petitioner also argues that the Tax Commission has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1321. Petitioner is incorrect. This section provides that the county 
legislative body can order a refund for property that "has been either erroneously or illegally 
assessed." The statute, however, does not provide for an appeal of the county's decision to the State 
Tax Commission. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the Tax Commission does not have 
jurisdiction to review the County's decision on a §59-2-1321 claim and has suggested that the 
appropriate body to review the County's decision was the district court.3 
PRD5R 
Based upon the Commission's review of the motion and consideration of the parties' 
positions, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
DATED this & day of J ^ £ ^ £ ^ > ^ 1999. 
%4kL 
Jaie Phan V 
Administrative Law Judae 
3
 See Blame Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n. 870 P.2d 291,294 
(1994) . 
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision. 
DATED this. A 
lchard B 
Chairman 
ABSENT* 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
^ day of. 
McKfcown / ^ * C 0 i W 4 > X 
•«r/ 
V U U M U H 
.'S. 
^Z 1999. 
j j ^ )ui^(L,oc«Jk^L. 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
/ « / < . JU/ZJL^ 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for 
Reconsideradon must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a 
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty 
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
JKP/99'02S7.di$ 
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C E K T I F I C A T E O P M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
A. E . , I n c . 
VS. 
Summit County BOE 
99-0257 
A.E., Inc., 
Petitioner 
c/o Milo Marsden _ 
68 South Main Street, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Frazier, Blake 
Respondent 
Summit County Auditor 
P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
Thomas, David 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County Deputy Attorney 
60 N. Main P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
fr / f t - . 
D a c e 7 7 
^£^ 
Tab 15 
MELO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC 
ATTORNEYS. FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A.E^ INC ) 
) REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff ) 
vs. ) Case No. 99-0257 
) (Judge Jane Phan) 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ) 
EQUALIZATION, ) 
Defendant ) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-466-13, Petitioner alleges the following 
points of law and fact which the Commission has overlooked or misapprehended: 
1. Petitioner did provide evidence that it qualified for the residential property tax 
exemption for the years 1992 through 1996. Petitioner has qualified for the residential 
property tax since 1992. Petitioner paid the 1992-1996 taxes with a letter stating that 
payment was made under protest and that petitioner qualified for the exemption. 
Respondent did not request nor have an affidavit requirement until 1997. Petitioner 
never received from respondent a denial of the refund request. 
2. Petitioner urges the Commission to focus on Section 59-2-1328, which gives the 
Commission jurisdiction in "any action" where a tax paid under protest was unlawfully 
0083 
collected. Thus, even if the Commission cannot order a refund, the Commission "sua 
sponte" can adjust County assessments. Yes, we could file in the district court; however, 
the Commission has jurisdiction sua sponte to adjust assessments of the counties. See 
Section 59-1-210. 
3. Lastly, a review of the Utah Constitution, Section 13, Section 2, and Utah 
Code Sections 52-2-103 and 59-2-1100, etc reveals that the residential exemption is in the 
Utah Constitution and in Section 59-1-103. On the other hand, the exemptions under 
Section 59-2-1100 etc, which provide for affidavit and exemptions, does not include the 
residential exemption. The residential exemption is self-contained and uses language 
referring to "this part." In short, the affidavit provision is not part of the residential 
exemption. 
DATED this IfrM- day of October, 1999. 
Milo S. Ma/sden, Jr. ( / 
MARSD^^AHOCHVGOTTFREDSON 
& BELLTtlC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION to Robert W. Atkins, Summit County Attorney, and David L 
Thon 
Coalville, Utah 84017, this /&*** of October, 1999, postage prepaid 
diet $t*s+/^ 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A.E., INC., i 
l IIR1JI K U t . M M l III I OINSIDI II * I l i M 
<*r, i 
l UJP'.'aiNo. 99-0257 
v. ) 
) 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF N - r — T — Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
SUMMIT COUNTY, ) 
UTAH, ) 
) 
Respondent. ,
 0_ Phan 
) 
This matter came betbre the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for 
Reconsideration, dated October 21,1999, t ^ u ^ . . . . . . : >1 
order datt . • 999. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Administrative Rule K801 1 -iy) provides IIMI A \hi\\\\u\x I KfMui'.uk'ntiun 
, oufiiis for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new 
:der tMs rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying 
i. a tor Reconsideration. 
Upon review of the arguments set out in Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration, 
-ilthough Petitioner disagree;) uih ill - I'nrniir .MI " *u 
i ill fii, iii? ill i ill I if in in 11 i.iii' I m i Id i nd ica t e a m i s t a k e in law or fact sufficient for t h e C o m m i s s i o n to r e c o n s i d e r 
RECEIVED 
DEC 9 1999 
Appeal N , ^ 99-0257 
its final order. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order «n! iho Utah Male lax 
i 'iiiiiim .' i in Illiiil llic I'l'iiii in Inii Ihn unuilenniin is ilnin-'il III i .11 nii!ni"ill 
DATED this . £mt ..day of 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH ii'l A1L J AX LUMM1SS1UN. 
(xvw * ' M I 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
R. Bruce Johns^* 
Commission^'' 
Palmer D e p a u i i s 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of 1 
order pursuant tolJtah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et seq. 
jKP/99^2S7.rec 
0073 
•Ik *1 W 
;e Tax Conur^.^ 
Appeal 
S 
Summit County BOE 
Petitioner 
c/o Milo Marsden 
68 South Main Street, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Frazier, slake 
Respondent 
Summit County Auditor 
P O Box 128 
Coalville ii r n in I ," 
Thomas, David 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County Deputy Attorney 
60 N. Main F 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 8^  
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of t:he £oregoi i: Ig ::ioci 11 i iei It 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
/ t^/k 
Date 

Ku. 
* r 
F I L E D 
DEC 2 2 1999 
Third Oistfiot Court 
MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTII I U »i )R 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
Deputy Clerk, Summit Cou irity 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, TAX DIVISION, STATE. OI L I AH 
A, L., INC.!., ii Ut.ill I orporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; and SUMMI' 
COUNTY TREASURER, 
Defendants. 
'v A . tmLbMus PK 
. w..*pidi;45 w*: ^ i c u a n t s am! 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff, A, I... lint", ,i Utah corporation, for cause of action against u u u . j a i 
alleges: 
] Plaintiff owns real property in Summit County, Utah described as follows: 
I Ji lit 7, thr Bull! 1'jifli I 1iil> it !><vi V illn, (Sen ill No. 
B E C jy 
Unit 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. 
00?:) 
2. During the years 1992 through 1996, Defendants denied Plaintiff the primary 
•"^'dential exemption for such property. 
3 For each of these years, Plaintiff paid'the tax with a i^"-* ~ -r^e that the 
pa) iiierit was made under protest as Plaintiff was em** u ,., ^.L %.Aunptk:ii. ,\ sample of 
the ai mi lal lettei is attached as Exhibit" !! ". 
4 For the 1997 tax year, Defendants provided'Plaintiff with a form entitled 
Summit County Allulavj . * d 
and filed. A copy is attached a^  Fxhfmt "B". 
•c/endants granted Viaiaixt: ,r,v. primary residential exemption Ini ."i> I1 
pron- -*v -n i997. 
Plaintiff filed a refund request with Defendants for the 1992 through 1996 tax 
;; <•* n • - ' : \ :--•'-" i me non-primary 
classification, \ ,'^p) *>t -he $70,182.79 worksheet ot i;i\ ditterence is attached as Exhibit 
"C". 
/. According to the Summit County Attorney, the Summit County Board of 
Commissioners, acting as u^ ik-ui^ * * ». nuau/au-^, ,*.,,,,: -.. .*.*],.t v. I-, 
1997. 
8. On June 30, 1998, Plaintiff appealed the Board of Commissioners Jailure to 
riiiiiii I ii i lli! I ll ili Si,iif 1 in * ( ViiiiiiiihMi in. 
9. On October 6, 1999, the Utah State Tax Commission dismissed the appeal, 
2 
stating that 
Utah Code Ann., Section 59-2-1327 provides that a taxpayer 
who claims the tax is unlawful can pay the taxes under 
protest, as the Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then 
file an action in district court. 
A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit "D" 
10 Plaintiff' filed a Request for Reconsideration on October 15, 1999. A copy is 
itti iched as Exhibit "E". 
I I | I,,, D^cnnbei {K l^w, lln I I'l.ili Stair lax ( nmirnssiiMi issun) its Oniei 
Deri)1 ing Reconsideration, A copy is attached as Exhibit "F". 
1 2 I 'laintiff has exhausted its administi ati ' e i emedj , 
13B xhis is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed 
which Plaintiff paid under protest annually. 
• * . Section 59-2-1327 and Section 59-1-301 (1992), a 
taxp< f who claims the tax is uniawiui can pay the taxes under protest, as the Petitioner 
f
. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants in the amount of 
$ 70,182. / 9, ii iter est, reasonable altunit) Ires, eosi". ul mil, am! genual iHit'f. 
002.1 
DATED this JMfTday of December, 1999. 
Milo S. Maps^ fen, Jr. 
MARSDmOAHOON, 
& BELL, LLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FREDSON 
4 
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EXHIBIT A 
October 31,1996 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Glen C Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A. E^ Ino, a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Qub at Deer 
Valley. The corporation is sending you a check in the amount of $40,872.00 in payment of 
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Qub at Deer Valley 
Utah. The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are 
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the 
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county 
and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the 
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest. 
Sincerely, 
A E., INC 
a Utah Corporation 
By 
0020 
EXHIBIT B 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
Affidavit Of Primary Residence 
Pursuant to 59-2-103 UCA 
I hereby certify that 
1) The taocjtfB owner of the following described property (please print name, street address or 
condominium unit number and mailing address).is: 
A. E., Inc., a Utah Corporation Serial* BBCT7 
Unit 7 The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley 
c/o Milo S, Marsden, Jr. 
68 South Main, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
y ^ of Bret Alan Anderson j ^ has 
2) The above described property is juy permanent, full time resideacj/andthaf MSPKno 
other permanent residence either in the State of Utah or any other state. 
Date of Occupancy Noventoer 20, 1992 
OR 
I am leasing the above described property on a year round basis as of the day of 
,19 • Attached is a copy of the lease agreement and/or below is the 
name and address of the person (s) the property is being leased to who use this property 
as a primary residence. 
I understand that pursuant to Utah Code 59-2-309 (2), that any misrepresentation of this affidavit 
subjects the owner to severe penalties. 
Signed J ^ 
A.E. Inc. , a Utah 
Milo S. Marsfloft, Jr. , Dsgad Counsel 
Dated February 3, 
Submission of this application authorizes the Assessor to request or collect information sufficient 
to verify primary residence status. A listing of criteria used to determine residence status is 
found on the back of this form. 
0017 
CTYUIDIT n 
WORKSHEET OF TAX DIFFERENCE 
(For Failure to Give Residential Exemption 
Under § 59-2-103, Utah Code Annotated) 
1996 Unit 7 
1996 Unit 8 
1995 Unit 7 
1995 Unit 8 
1994 Unit 7 
1994 Unit 8 
$4,216,103 
644,000 
3,488,103 
560,000 
1,641,068 
393,750 
$48,240.65 
7,368.65 
44,333.79 
7,117.60 
26,844.59 
6,440.96 
x45% 
x45% 
x45% 
x45% 
x32% 
x32% 
s : 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
$21,708.29 
3,315.89 
19,950.21 
3,202.92 
8,590.27 
2,061.11 
1993 Unit 7 
1993 Unit 8 
1,641,06s1* 
393,750* 
26,320.85 29.5-5=24.5% = 6,448.61 
6,31534 29.5-5=24.5% = 1,547.26 
1992 Unit 7 443,750* 
1992 Unit 8 393,750* 
TOTAL' 
7,262.69 29.5-5=24.5% = 1,779.36 
6,444.38 29.5-5=24.5% = 1.578.87 
$70,182.79 
Taxable value for 1992 and 1993 vac 951 of aarkst ralua. 
S 59-2-103 
Beginning January 1, 1992, and erery yaar thereafter tha fair aarkat Talaa of 
raa ldant ia l pxoparty shall ba raducad by 29.SOI, representing a raaldantial 
exesjptioo allowed under Article XIII, Sac. 2 , Utah Constitution. 
Beginning January 1, 1994, and arary yaar thereaftsr tha fair aarkat Talaa of 
raa idant ia l pxoparty shall ba radacad by 321, representing a ras idant ia l 
exessptioij allowed andar Xrtlola XIXX, f ee . 2 , Otah Constitution. 
• •g inning Juno 1, 1993, tha fa ir markst Talua of rasidantial property sha l l 
ba raducad by 431, representing a rasidantial exemption allowed under Xrtlola 
XIII, Sac. 2 , Utah Constitution. 
001 fi 
LAW OFFICES 
MA2I8DXN, CAHOON, OOTTFRXD80N £ BELL, LJL.C, 
FIFTH FLOOR 
*fios.«uisoc*.j«. 6 6 SOUTH MAIN 
mcHAftoccAMOOM,*c
 g A I ^ T I | A j n | C U T A H a 4 1 0 1 a u M W K a 
j . MHTHAP. oarnmcoscM wotw i r. o*ro* »«c 
(80I) 321-3800 
FAX (SOU 537-13/3 
April 24, 1997 
Summit County Commission 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Re: Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8 
Dear Commission Members: 
I represent AJE. Inc., a Utah corporation, which has paid taxes under protest since 
1992 for failure of the Summit County Assessor to grant the residential 45% reduction 
exemption allowed by Article XDI, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and implemented by the 
Utah Legislature as § 59-2-103. 
A copy of the 1997 Assessor's letter granting the exemption is enclosed. 
I am enclosing copies of the 1992 -1996 property tax notices. All payments were 
made in full under protest by certified mail, return receipt requested. I am also enclosing 
the worksheet of the tax difference, $70,18179. 
It is respectfully requested that you grant the refund because the properties should 
have received the primary residential reduction, but due to the Assessor's error in 
classification, it was not granted Therefore, it should be refunded at this time. 
If you have any questions, please give me a call. 
Very truly yours, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
MSM/gz 
Enclosures 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A.E., INC., ) 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
Petitioner, ) TO DISMISS 
v. ) Appeal No. 99-0257 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) 
SUMMIT COUNTY, ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent. ) Judge: Phan 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 20,1999, Respondent filed in this matter a Motion to Dismiss on the basis 
that Petitioner failed to timely file its appeal before the State Tax Commission. Petitioner had 
submitted a Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction on July 9, 1999, and submitted a Response to 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding 
Jurisdiction on August 9, 1999. 
Petitioner owns real property in Summit County and for the years 1992 through 1996 
Petitioner was denied the primary residential exemption for such property. For each of these years 
Petitioner paid the tax with a letter stating that the payment was made under protest as Petitioner was 
entitled to the exemption. Petitioner did not file an affidavit, nor provide any evidence that it 
qualified for the residential property tax exemption. In addition. Petitioner apparently did not file 
an appeal of the exemption status with the Summit County Board of Equalization for the years in 
question. For the 1997 tax year Petitioner filed the appropriate application and affidavit and was 
granted the primary residential exemption. Petitioner then filed a refund request with the County for 
Appeal No. 99-0257 
the 1992 through 1996 tax years. According to Respondent's attorney the Summit County Board of 
Commissioners, acting as the Board of Equalization, denied the request on August 14, 1997. This 
denial was communicated to Petitioner by letter from Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor. 
Petitioner did not file an appeal of the decision to the State Tax Commission until July 1998. 
Petitioner argues that this is not an appeal from an adverse exemption ruling with the 
30 day limitation period allowed under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1102(7). Instead Petitioner indicates 
that this is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed which it paid under 
protest annually and Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to bring this action before the State Tax 
Commission under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1328l or §59-2-1321. 
The Tax Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal in either instance.2 
Petitioner did not comply with the administrative remedies of timely filing an appeal with the County 
Board of Equalization annually within thirty days from the date of the property tax notices and then 
timely filing an appeal annually with the State Tax Commission pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. 
This provision does not support Petitioner's claim as it 
merely details how payment is to be made if a refund is ordered. 
It is presumably read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §59-2-
1327 which indicates the procedure for obtaining an order of 
refund. 
2See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com;n, 870 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah App. 1994) . In Blaine Hudson the court stated, "A taxpayer 
faced with an allegedly erroneous assessment ordinarily has two 
statutory methods of challenging the ensuing tax. First, Utah 
Code Ann. §§59-2-1004, -1005 (1992) provide that the taxpayer can 
file an administrative appeal with the County Board of 
Equalization. Second, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301(1992) authorizes 
the taxpayer to pay under protest and seek to recover the tax 
paid in an action brought in district court." 
-2-
Appeal No. 99-0257 
§59-2-1006. Petitioner's appeal to the State Tax Commission nearly one year later is untimely. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1327 provides that a taxpayer who claims the tax is unlawful 
can pay the taxes under protest, as Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then file an action in 
district court. A similar remedy is provided in Utah Code Ann. §59-l-3Dl, which again specifically 
states that the action is to be filed in district court. 
Petitioner also argues that the Tax Commission has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1321. Petitioner is incorrect. This section provides that the county 
legislative body can order a refund for property that "has been either erroneously or illegally 
assessed." The statute, however, does not provide for an appeal of the county's decision to the State 
Tax Commission. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the Tax Commission does not have 
jurisdiction to review the County's decision on a §59-2-1321 claim and has suggested that the 
appropriate body to review the County's decision was the district court.3 
ORDER 
Based upon the Commission's review of the motion and consideration of the parties' 
positions, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
DATED this & day of J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ V ^ 1999. ^  f J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f 
Jaie Phan 1/ 
Administrative Law Judge 
3
 See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n, 870 P.2d 291,294 
(1994) . 
-3-
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision. 
DATED this tf day of Qv/£&*i6-&f J 1999. 
Richard B. McK| 
chairman 
AESSW. 
own / ^ * c o % , : \ 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
TcLm Jum(L^~*-A<^L__ 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
UUA. JU 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for 
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a 
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty 
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
JKP/99-0257.dis 
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C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
| A. E., Inc. 
vs. 
Summit County BOE | 
99-0257 
' Ji 
A.E., Inc., 
Petitioner 
c/o Milo Marsden _ 
68 South Main Street, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Frazier, Blake 
Respondent 
Summit County Auditor 
P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
Thomas, David 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County Deputy Attorney 
60 N. Main P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
ZL 
Date 77 Y^ 
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EXHIBIT E 
MELO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A. E., INC., ) 
) REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) Case No. 99-0257 
) (Judge Jane Phan) 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ) 
EQUALIZATION, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-466-13, Petitioner alleges the following 
points of law and fact which the Commission has overlooked or misapprehended: 
1. Petitioner did provide evidence that it qualified for the residential property tax 
exemption for the years 1992 through 1996. Petitioner has qualified for the residential 
property tax since 1992. Petitioner paid the 1992-1996 taxes with a letter stating that 
payment was made under protest and that petitioner qualified for the exemption. 
Respondent did not request nor have an affidavit requirement until 1997. Petitioner 
never received from respondent a denial of the refund request. 
2. Petitioner urges the Commission to focus on Section 59-2-1328, which gives the 
Commission jurisdiction in "any action" where a tax paid under protest was unlawfully 
collected. Thus, even if the Commission cannot order a refund, the Commission "sua 
sponte" can adjust County assessments. Yes, we could file in the district court; however, 
the Commission has jurisdiction sua sponte to adjust assessments of the counties. See 
Section 59-1-210. 
3. Lastly, a review of the Utah Constitution, Section 13, Section 2, and Utah 
Code Sections 52-2-103 and 59-2-1100, etc. reveals that the residential exemption is in the 
Utah Constitution and in Section 59-1-103. On the other hand, the exemptions under 
Section 59-2-1100 etc., which provide for affidavit and exemptions, does not include the 
residential exemption. The residential exemption is self-contained and uses language 
referring to "this part." In short, the affidavit provision is not part of the residential 
exemption. 
DATED this \<fti day of October, 1999. 
Milo S. Madden, Jr. I 1 
M A R S D E ^ A H O O N ^ 
& B E I l ^ t X c 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
000G 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION to Robert W. Atkins, Summit County Attorney, and David L 
Thomas, Deputy Summit County attorney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, 
Coalville, Utah 84017, this _/£_Sday of October, 1999, postage prepaid. 
Ax/ tf/syj^ 
3 
\ X / 2 0 % Post Consumer Waste 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A.E., INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
Appeal No. 99-0257 
Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
Judge: Phan 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for 
Reconsideration, dated October 21, 1999, filed by Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final 
order dated October 6, 1999. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-29 provides that a Petition for Reconsideration 
"will allege as grounds for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new 
evidence." Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying 
a Petition for Reconsideration. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Upon review of the arguments set out in Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration, 
although Petitioner disagrees with the Commission's final decision, Petitioner did not provided 
information that would indicate a mistake in law or fact sufficient for the Commission to reconsider 
R E C E I V E D 
0003 
Appeal No. 99-0257 
its final order. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of the Utah State Tax 
Commission that the Petition for Reconsideration is denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 2i day of / V &^*^*^/*~*^S . 1999. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
OUw\ .a 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commission^ 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
CuJlo*-> 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this 
order pursuant toUtah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46M3 et. seq. 
JKP/99-0257 rec 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 0 F M A I L I N G 
Utah S t a t e Tax Commission 
Appeal 
A. E . , Inc . 
VS. 
Summit County BOE 
99-0257 
A.E., Inc., 
Petitioner 
c/o Milo Marsden 
68 South Main Street, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Frazier, Blake 
Respondent 
Summit County Auditor 
P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
Thomas, David 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County Deputy Attorney 
60 N. Main P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
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THE 
SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH; APRIL 17 ,2000 
HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER 
COURT: 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
This is case 990600463 A. E. 
vs. Summit County Commission, et al. Will counsel 
appearances? 
MR. 
appearing and 
MR, 
BAYLES: 
arguing 
MARSDEN 
Thank you, Your Honor, 
for Summit County. 
: Milo Marsden for the 
Incorporated 
please state 
David Bayles 
Plaint iff Taxpayer, 
MR. THOMAS: David Thomas for Summit County. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. It's good to see you 
this morning and I appreciate the briefing and the courtesy 
copies and I have read the entire file including all memoranda 
and exhibits, so I'm well up on it as far as the reading, than 
well up, between the cross-motions I got to hear it twice at 
least. It seemed like more than twice actually. But I think 
I'm very familiar with the underlying facts and I'd ask you 
appreaeh it any way you'd like. The first question that is in 
my mind, probably not the only one by the time we're done; I've 
never dealt with this issue of the residential exemption until 
I came to Summit County. Since then I have had it in other 
context but I don't know how other counties do it. Is this 
affidavit something that all counties follow exactly the same 
form or is that a local approach? That's something that I'd 
like to know but approach it anyway you like. 
1 
MR. THOMAS: We can certainly address that because 
Barbara Kesler is the County Assessor. Mr. Bayles will address 
that. 
THE COURT: Okay, Thank you. Go ahead Counsel. 
MR. BAYLES: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: I guess they are cross motions, but we'll 
start with you and just so no one get hung up about who gets 
rebuttal, you can all say all you want. 
MR, BAYLES: Thank you. May it please the Court, my 
name again is David Bayles. I'm pleased to be presenting for 
Summit County. Plaintiff paid his real property taxes for the 
tax years 1992 through and including 1996 on two units of 
property at the Bald Eagle Club, Deer Valley Resort, Summit 
County, Utah and with each tax payment, accompanied it by a 
letter stating that the tax was paid under protest. The letter 
mentioned a residential property tax exemption. 
In 1999, December of that year, Plaintiff filed the 
complaint in this eourt alleging that his property had been 
taxed unlawfully. Defendants now bring this motion praying 
this Court to rule that there has been no unlawful taxation of 
the property; that the statute of limitations bars the 
complaint for the tax years 1992 through 1995 and that the 
definition of the residential property exemption does not apply 
to Plaintiff's unimproved parcels. Summary Judgment is of 
course, appropriate in this state where there are no genuine 
2 
1 issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
2 judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to the pleadings the 
3 parties are in agreement that there are no genuine issues of 
4 material fact. 
5 Defendants offer three questions of law that are 
6 right for this Court for decision. The first one is, the 
7 presence of this strict application requirement. The second 
8 is, the effect of the statute of limitations. And the third 
9 is, this definition of residential property tax exemption as 
10 applied to the unimproved parcel. 
11 The first question of law, the strict application 
12 requirement, is supported by three principles. The first one 
13 is the plain language of the statute. The second, the Utah 
14 State Tax Commission rules, and the third, general policy 
15 considerations of equity. 
16 The first principle, the plain language of the 
17 statute. Utah Code 59-2-1102, sub-paragraph 2, says that no 
18 exemption shall be granted unless there is an application filed 
19 and that that application is verified by oath and sets forth 
20 facts upon which the exemption can be granted. Now, there's 
21 been some suggestion that Plaintiff's letter of protest might 
22 perhaps qualify as this application. 
23 Summit County disagrees. That letter simply stated 
24 that a residential property exemption should have been afforded 
25 but does not state any factual basis upon which it should have 
1 been granted. It's not signed by the person who was living 
2 there at the residence; alleged to have been living there and 
3 it's not verified by oath, suggesting that the person who was 
4 alleged to have been living there, did not realize the grave 
5 import of being truthful with those who would read that 
6 application and accordingly, it's Defendant's position that the 
7 strict application requirements of Section 59-2-1102 were not 
8 complied with. Long standing rules of statutory construction 
9 in this case say that where a statute is unambiguous, that it 
10 must be according to the plain language of the statute and that 
11 is the reading of 59-1-1102. 
12 The second principle that supports this strict 
13 application requirement, are the rules of the Utah State Tax 
14 Commission. The Tax Commission has said that the taxpayer 
15 bears the burden of coming forth with that evidence upon which 
16 an exemption should be granted and goes on to further state 
17 that conclusive evidence must be presented so that the taxing 
18 entity ean make an evaluation of the qualifications and 
19 determine whether or not an exemption is appropriate. Thus, 
20 those rules of the Utah State Tax Commission support this 
21 strict application requirement that's in the code. 
22 THE COURT: In both those areas, I guess, the statute 
23 and the rule, I think Mr. Marsden raises an issue of note, as 
24 he responded to this constructive notice. How does the 
25 taxpayer know about, I mean know it's a statute. There's an 
1 issue, I think, of whether this exemption is included within 
2 that statute; but even on the Tax Commission Rule, which takes 
3 it a step further, that you're relying on also, how does this 
4 information get conveyed to the taxpayer? 
5 MR. BAYLES: The constructive notices, the presence in 
6 the statute. The statute has been in place without amendment 
7 since 1988. In this particular case, where the Plaintiff is 
8 represented by a member of the Utah State Bar, that member of 
9 the bar should be deemed with the notice to go forth and to 
10 check the statute. 
11 THE COURT: Is there a different standard if you're 
12 represented by a lawyer? What if he wasn't? Would he still be 
13 on constructive notice? 
14 MR. BAYLES: No, well, the constructive notice is 
15 within the code and the taxpayer would be duly, or should be 
16 deemed, to at least contact the county and to find out what 
17 application is required to receive this exemption. 
18 THE COURT: Is that what happens? If a taxpayer does 
19 contact the county and say I want this exemption, is there some 
20 process in place whereby he or she is then told what to do? 
21 MR, BAYLES: Yes, Your Honor, There is an application 
22 form that is used by the county and that application is sent 
23 out to the taxpayer. 
24 THE COURT: But sending out that form is not treated 
25 by a protest, a payment under protest? 
MR. BAYLES: No Your Honor. The payment under protest 
in this particular case, was paid to the Summit County 
Treasurer. 
THE COURT: That's a different entity/ isn't it? I 
mean the assessor does not send them onto the assessor and say, 
"Look at that". 
MR. BAYLES: That's correct. The treasurer— 
THE COURT: I noted that and I wasn't (inaudible), 
MR, BAYLES: Thank you. 
General policy considerations also support this 
strict application requirement. The taxpayer is in the 
exclusive control of the information, the evidence upon which 
an exemption may be granted and as such should be required to 
come forth with that information and evidence and apply for the 
exemption. Were it otherwise, the Summit County Assessor's 
Office would be charged with going forth and ferreting out this 
information and evidence upon which any possible exemption 
eould be based. Indeed the benefit that eould be derived from 
this real property taxation model, would be consumed by this 
exemption investigation team, charged with the responsibility 
of seeking out this information. Indeed, by way of general 
policy, government efficiencies and economy of resources, 
support this strict application requirement. 
Thus, under this first principle of law, Defendants 
pray this Court to rule that the strict application 
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1 requirement, not having been met, therefore, requires a finding 
2 that there's no unlawful taxation. 
3 The second principle of law is the statute of 
4 limitations. In the annotation to 59-2-1327, there's an 
5 annotation titled ^Statute of Limitations' and a case cited 
6 there; Centennial Eureka Mining Company versus Juab County. In 
7 that case, a Utah constitutional provision provided for the 
8 taxation of mining proceeds and gave an effective date. 
9 THE COURT; I read that and you laid it out and I 
10 think you said in one of your statements, it does not deem to 
11 be a significant or any dispute over which statute of 
12 limitations applies. It all comes down to accrual and the 
13 argument is, if we were doing the administrative route it would 
14 toll statutes. Is there any law on that? 
15 MR. BAYLES: Except for this case, it says that the 
16 moment the tax is paid under protest the cause of action 
17 accrues and that no other, the case specifically says, that no 
18 other requirements need be met. 
19 THE COURT: And that's a hundred years ago. 
20 MR. BAYLES: That's right. A long standing rule in 
21 this state and the Defendant was very careful to shepardize 
22 that and finds that is still the law in this state. 
23 Accordingly, Plaintiff's taxation, Plaintiff's 
24 payment of taxes under protest from 1992 to 1995 should be 
25 deemed by this Court to be barred by the statute of 
1 limitations. 
2 Now, the third principle of law that's a companion to 
3 that second argument, is the effect of the definition upon 
4 Plaintiff § Unit 8 property whigh was assessed as unimproved. 
5 Definition says that the property must be residential to 
6 qualify for this exemption and accordingly, the Unit 8 property 
7 which was unimproved, should be deemed to have been taxed 
8 lawfully. And also as a corollary to that argument, sub-
9 paragraph 3 of 59-2-103 limits the exemption to the first acre 
10 of land and Plaintiff's Units 7 and 8's property together, 
11 total 1.57 acres of land and accordingly it would be 
12 appropriate to rule that the majority of that Unit 8 property 
13 under that provision was not taxed unlawfully. 
14 Thus, in summary Your Honor, Summit County prays this 
15 Court to rule that there's been no unlawful taxation of 
16 Plaintiff's property in all years; that the statute of 
17 limitations bars recovery for the 1992 through 1995 claims. 
18 And that the definition of the exemption bars recovery for the 
19 Unit 8, unimproved property, or in the alternative there that 
20 sub-paragraph 3, limits it to one acre. Thank you. 
21 THE COURT; Thank you, Mr. Bayles. 
22 Mr. Marsden? 
23 MR. MARSDEN: Thank you, Your Honor, Counsel and 
24 members of Summit County government, and Your Honor. 
25 Brief factual history, the Plaintiff as stated did 
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1 pay the real property taxes under protest, in writing, for the 
2 years 1992 through 1996 and there are two statutes, 59-1-301 
3 regarding payment under protest, and 59-2*1327, payment under 
4 protest which was cited in each letter. It's our contention 
5 that the property meets the residential requirement as used in 
6 the statute and it has been used as a primary residence. 
7 THE COURT: Do you contend that to be so for more than 
8 the acre, or just the one acre? 
9 MR, MARSDEN: Your Honor, I have to concede that the 
10 statute does say one acre and in my presentation I exceed to 
11 that and take that into account. That should be taken into 
12 account. 
13 THE COURT: I think up to the acre, I don't think you 
14 really have a dispute then whether it qualifies. It's really a 
15 very difficult problem equitably I think that it appears to 
16 qualify all along, that's really not going to be our stumbling 
17 block. It's whether there can be a refund; whether it's 
18 timely; whether procedure was followed. So... 
19 MR. MARSDEN: That's what I thought, however, I read 
20 the pleadings that there may be an issue as to whether the 
21 resident was a resident. Now, I don't think there is but I 
22 could see— 
23 THE COURT: Maybe you should clarify that before you 
24 concede anything. 
25 Mr. Bayles, is there a question whether it was? 
1 MR. BAYLES: Your Honor, there is nothing before this 
2 Court from Mr. Anderson stating that he was a resident. 
3 THE COURT: So at this point, you still lack an 
4 affidavit for those. Is the affidavit an every year 
5 requirement on this exemption? 
6 MR. BAYLES: No, it's not. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. On some exemptions it is; is that 
8 correct? 
9 MR, BAYLES: That's correct, Your Honor, 
10 THE COURT: But you say the affidavit doesn't cover 
11 those years. Obviously that could be corrected. 
12 MR. BAYLES: That's right. 
13 MR. MARSDEN: So the result was that the Plaintiff 
14 paid his property taxes based on one hundred percent of fair 
15 market value as opposed to fifty-five percent and as originally 
16 calculated, the difference was about $70,000; but if we take 
17 into account the one-acre limitation and I admit that there was 
18 a factual error in the addition that would bring it down by my 
19 figures to $55,576.66. 
20 Now, payment under protest says, where a tax is 
21 demanded and the person whose property is taxed, claims the tax 
22 is unlawful, that person may pay the tax under protest to the 
23 county treasurer. The person may then bring an action in the 
24 district court against the officer or taxing entity to recover 
25 the tax or any portion of the tax paid under protest. Now, 
10 
1 it's our contention that Brad Allen Anderson resided on the 
2 property during the years in question, 1992 through 1996 
3 continuously and that it was his primary residence and that the 
4 Plaintiff is entitled to the taxes based upon the fifty-five 
5 percent fair market value• 
6 Now, a taxpayer has two ways to go, as I've learned. 
7 He can go by way of administrative appeal, or he can go by 
8 district court action. It's not an election of remedies, but 
9 those two avenues are open and in the case Blaine Hudson, which 
10 is 870 Pacific second 291, a 1994 Supreme Court decision, the 
11 court says "A taxpayer faced with an allegedly erroneous 
12 assessment ordinarily has two statutory methods of challenging 
13 the ensuing tax. First, Utah Code annotated Sections 59-2-104 
14 and 105 provide the taxpayer can file an administrative appeal 
15 with the County Board of Equalization." 
16 Second, Utah Code annotated Section 59-1-301 and it 
17 would include 59-2-1327, "authorizes the taxpayer to pay under 
18 protest and seek to recover the tax paid in an action brought 
19 in district court." 
20 The court also says this, which I think is pertinent 
21 and very interesting and it's a quote, "In either case, the 
22 county is on notice that the assessment and the tax are being 
23 challenged and in both cases the taxpayer has an explicit right 
24 to appeal an unfavorable decision". 
25 What did the taxpayer do here? The taxpayer did 
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1 proceed under an administrative appeal and the admitted facts, 
2 the claim filed with the treasurer paying the taxes in full for 
3 years 1992 through 1996. There were appeals to the Board of 
4 Equalization for the value and the classification adjustments, 
5 and there was some relief given on values and I think it's 
6 probably unnecessary to go into those; but there was this 
7 constant contact on classification and value issues. 
8 THE COURT: Starting as early as what year? 
9 MR, MARSDEN: Well, I know that with regards to 
10 classification facts, there was a letter sent August 22, 1995 
11 seeking an appointment and on September 5, 1995, a call to 
12 Steve Martin who was in the Assessor's Office charged with this 
13 area and the assessment issues. I received on September 12, 
14 1996 a review of the market value and it said and/or 
15 classification and the classification change will be reflected 
16 on the tax notice. Now, the tax notice, when it did come did 
17 not reflect the change. Taxes were paid in 1995 again under 
18 protest. There was no notice to the taxpayer regarding a 
19 hearing or application or affidavit on a primary residential 
20 classification. This didn't happen until 1997 when we were 
21 told about that and we did file it immediately and the primary 
22 residential classification was granted for the year 1997. 
23 We then requested a refund for the prior years, that 
24 was in March of 1997. The affidavit was dated February 3, 1997 
25 and as I said, the assessor changed it to the primary 
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1 residential on April 17, 1997. What I was frankly pursuing was 
2 have I exhausted my administrative remedy and continued to 
3 pursue that with a lot of contact from-
4 THE COURT: Did you believe, Mr. Marsden, that you had 
5 to exhaust it before you could go the district court route? 
6 You've laid it out that you have two options under the statute. 
7 MR. MARSDEN: Yeah, to be honest, I thought that I 
8 did. Today, I don't think I did. The assessor sent me a 
9 resolution passed by the county in June, 1992 where the county 
10 said that there are equitable considerations that require tax 
11 refunds to taxpayers who qualified for the primary residential 
12 classification but who paid the full rate. The treasurer 
13 authorized to make the refunds on the difference between the 
14 taxes paid at the one hundred percent rate and the lower rate. 
15 I'm not made aware of this until 1997, however, and I talked 
16 with Dave Thomas and said I need a final determination from the 
17 commission. I called the county clerk for an agenda time. 
18 Sent a certified letter to the assessor to get a final 
19 determination. Requested a hearing. Sent a letter again to 
20 Dave Thomas in March 20, 1998. No official decision from the 
21 Commission, I requested a meeting with the commission. 
22 Nothing happened. I did finally appeal the administrative 
23 route to the Tax Commission on July 16, 1998. We went through 
24 that and it was dismissed on December 8, 1999 with the Tax 
25 Commission referring to the payment under protest statute 59-2-
13 
1327. So within about two or three weeks I filed this action. 
Now, I think the pertinent issues revolve around the 
statute of limitations. Does it start when you pay the tax? 
And I believe that hundred year old case still stands for that 
proposition; but the issue then becomes, does it get tolled? 
And the ease Baker versus Tax Commission which is 520 Pacific 
second, 203, a 1974 case says "we hold that the commission does 
have the power to remove from the assessment roles property 
which it finds to be constitutionally or statutorily exempt 
from taxation and that it is not necessary for a taxpayer to 
pay under protest and to be put to the expense of a lawsuit 
until he has exhausted his administrative remedies." Well, 
I've outlined what steps were taken and how we did go that 
route. 
Now, I think it's informative to look at tolling 
statute 78-12-40 which Judge Billings has an opinion, I'll give 
you the citation, she refers to that as the xsavings statute'. 
And it says, "if any action is commenced within due time, and 
Plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action, 
otherwise and upon the merits and the time limited either by 
law or by contract for commencing the same, shall have expired, 
the Plaintiff may commence a new action within one year after 
the failure". 
So what are the open years? If we look at the 
administrative actions as beginning a tolling effect, they'd 
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is entitled CP versus Utah Office of Crime Victims Reparations. 
It's 966 Pacific second 12-26, it's a 1998 Utah appellate case. 
It did go to the Supreme Court on certiorari and was denied. 
Fgr me it stands for the proposition that an administrative 
procedure can be tolled by the savings statute -
THE COURT: But does that mean that an administrative 
procedure will be treated as an initial filing which when 
dismissed or concluded other than on the merit was saved, the 
saving statute one year period to file again? 
MR. MARSDEN: I believe so. 
THE COURT: It doesn't sound like it's quite the same 
thing. 
And the other question that I have, you've been 
through a full process just for appeal. Is that other than on 
the merits? 
MR- MARSDEN; Yes, because it says we don't get to 
that issue. You're to look to the district court under your 
13-27 Section• But even if weren't, from the beginning of the 
Administrative Appeal, certainly when the appeal, the formal 
appeal is filed with the Tax Commission in July of 1998, the 
year 1994, 5, 6, would be open on that theory. So again, if 
it's the administrative action that qualifies for the tolling 
of the savings statute, all years are open. If it's filing the 
appeal, taking that kind of an action, in 1998, the years 1994, 
5, and 6 would be open. And if none of them apply, at least 
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§, and 6 would be open. And if none of them apply, at least 
1995, let's see, filed in '99, '95, certainly '96 would be 
open. 
I've given you the citation of Judge Billings and I 
don't think I need to read from it. I'd be happy to entertain 
any -
THE COURT: But the facts in the CP Case were that a 
savings statute applied to an administrative action dismissed 
not on the merit but for refiling of another administrative 
action in that case? 
MR. MARSDEN: It was sent back to the administrative 
agency for action. Frankly, Your Honor I don't remember the 
specifics of -
THE COURT: Tell me about that Baker case with the Tax 
Commission again. Do you have that there? Baker, 520 Pacific 
second? 
MR. MARSDEN: I do. 
THE COURT: Yes, I'm not sure I understood the facts 
and holding in that. 
MR. MARSDEN: Well, I'm not sure that I needed it or 
said it clearly. What it said to me was that it's - I don't 
want to get caught up and it hasn't been -
THE COURT: You said they didn't have to pay a tax 
under protest or be required to go to the court, forced to? 
MR. MARSDEN: Yeah. Just let me... 
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1 THE COURT: Take the time you need. We don't have 
2 anyone waiting for us, 
3 MR. MARSDEN: We hold that the Commission does have 
4 the power to do certain things that don't apply to this and 
5 that it is not necessary for a taxpayer to pay under protest 
6 and be put to the expense of a lawsuit until he has exhausted 
7 his administrative remedies. What I have trouble with, is, 
8 what should I have done? I've learned, hindsight is great, the 
9 two opportunities and what that shows to me is that I didn't 
10 have to even pay under protest. I could have gone the 
11 administrative route; but it was paid under protest so maybe 
12 that... 
13 THE COURT: But once you pay under protest, does that 
14 put you in the lawsuit tract? I mean do you have an option to 
15 go back administratively? You did it. It finished up being 
16 sent back to the district court and that's the ruling of the 
17 Tax Commission. Do you find any law that says once you've paid 
18 under protest you really do have the choice? 
19 MR. MARSDEN: Well, I do. That's the way I read that 
20 Blaine Hudson Case, "A taxpayer faced with an allegedly 
21 erroneous assessment ordinarily has two statutory methods". 
22 THE COURT: Again, that's what I'm thinking about. 
23 One is to go the Board of Equalization or address it that way; 
24 the other is to pay under protest and sue in the district 
25 court. 
17 
MR. MARSDEN: Correct. And they go on to say "in 
either case# the County is on notice that the assessment and 
the tax are being challenged. And in both cases the taxpayer 
has an explicit right tQ appeal an unfavorable decision". What 
I have problem with is in dealing with the county, not being 
told about what they tell me is constructive notice that I 
should have gotten my taxpayer owner to file an affidavit and 
that this was an application procedure. 
THE COURT; I guess what we hear there is two 
different entities within the County, sub-entities, involved, 
the treasurer and the assessor and the treasurer doesn't have 
either the knowledge or the responsibility to tell you and 
there was no communication with the assessor so they weren't on 
notice that you were even making the protest, that would 
therefore not trigger or generate the notice you're seeking. 
Is that what you're hearing too? 
MR. MARSDEN: I don't know about any communication 
between the treasurer and the assessor but eertainly I had 
contact with both. And the point that I struggled with and I 
think I find the answer in this Blaine Hudson case, in either 
case/ whether paying under protest or going the administrative 
route, the Supreme Court says the County is on notice that the 
assessment and the tax are being challenged. 
THE COURT: What were the contacts with the assessor 
from 1992 through 1996? 
18 
1 MR. MARSDEN: Following the notice to the Board of 
2 Equalization; being put in touch with Steve Martin in the 
3 Assessor's office -
4 THE COURT: When did this occur? 
5 MR. MARSDEN: There may be earlier dates but I can 
6 tell the Court that certainly by August 22, 1995 I have a 
7 document and then I certified letters to the assessor about the 
8 classification and the market value issues and parenthetically 
9 we went to the Tax Commission on the market value issue. We 
10 resolved it, settled it by stipulation but we didn't settle the 
11 classification issue. 
12 THE COURT: Have you raised the residential 
13 classification issue in 1995? 
14 MR. MARSDEN: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: In that letter? 
16 MR. MARSDEN: Y©s? 
17 THE COURT: Was that one of your exhibits? Did I 
18 miss that? 
19 MR. MARSDEN: It's not. 
20 THE COURT: Do you have it there? 
21 MR, MARSDEN: I don't honestly remember. I have a copy 
22 of the certified mail. 
23 THE COURT: But not the letter itself? 
24 MR. MARSDEN: Yes. It's the letter with the certified 
25 mail. 
19 
THE COURT: Does it refer to a classification 
residential classification or not? 
MR. MARSDEN: Let's see. *I am in receipt of your 
notice of property valuation and tax change for 1995 on the 
captioned properties. I called your office to arrange for a 
hearing appointment. I was told that Steve Martin is handling 
these valuations and would call me. 
I also note that the deadline for application to the 
Board of Equalization is September 8, 1995, This letter is to 
serve as application to the Board of Equalization for an appeal 
on the market value of the captioned properties." 
THE COURT: So that one was directed to market value. 
You may have the other thing in mind but it wasn't set forth. 
Any other matters, Mr. Marsden? 
MR. MARSDEN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Response Mr. Bayles? 
MR. BAYLES: Thank you, Your Honor. The presumption 
is that property is assessed at one hundred pereent of market 
value unless this application is made and it's disingenuous to 
assert that because the payment of tax under protest was made, 
that accordingly an exemption could have been qualified for 
that therefore, it was also unlawfully taxes. The unlawfulness 
which is the claim of the Plaintiff here does not arise until 
the exemption arises to the property and the exemption is 
created by the Constitution. It's created by the exemption and 
20 
it's created by application for the exemption. Once that 
application is made and if the exemption was then denied, then 
Plaintiff might appropriately be able to say that their 
property has been unlawfully taxed. 
Now on this question of the statute of limitations. 
This is the first that Summit County is hearing about this 
Baker Case today but it sounded like what it provided for was 
two parallel ways to attack this problem, the payment under tax 
protest way and the administrative remedies way. But the 
presence of two actions does not necessary mean that the 
ability to exhaust remedies tolls the complaint in the district 
court. In fact/ the complaint in the district court, because 
of the greater expense that it puts the Plaintiff to, could be 
said to be a failsafe after exhausting administrative remedies 
in the negative. 
Now, as to the statute that was mentioned, the toll 
saving statute. It says that, well, Summit County isn't sure 
that it even applies in this case beeause of it speaks of 
actions being dismissed on the merits and it was an 
administrative action that Plaintiff brought and had dismissed 
rather than an action in the district court. 
One other thing by way of equities of this case, Your 
Honor, these monies have been long since collected in a general 
fund of Summit County and long since expended for the benefit 
of the residents of Summit County to allow the Plaintiff to 
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come back now under a deficient or non-existent application and 
then recover for those exemptions that should have been applied 
for in the past, is to put a serious strain on the coffers of 
the government inappropriately as mentioned, particularly in 
this case, because of the constructive notice at the very least 
that the Plaintiff was under. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bayles. 
Anything further, Mr. Marsen? 
MR. MARSDEN: Yes, Your Honor. I'm sensitive to the 
paying cash and I proposed that if that's a problem, just give 
credit for years to come. I don't know if that's an 
appropriate item for this forum. 
THE COURT: That goes with the argument that it's a 
strain on the coffers. 
MR. MARSDEN: Let me go into now the necessity of 
affidavit and application. I can of hoped to avoid that 
because I had finally concluded in my mind, that if you go back 
through the district court you don't get caught up in all that 
affidavit, application bit, it's just that's the administrative 
procedure. The issue for the district court is does the 
taxpayer qualify for the exemption? Was it used as primary 
residential property for the years being raised? But there are 
some interesting issues on the affidavit, application. The 
Code in the revenue and taxation sections, under what's called 
the property tax act, the general provisions, provide for this 
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residential exemption and it says the rate of assessment of 
residential property is the heading and today and back, I 
don't know when it began but "fair market of residential 
property shall be reduced by forty-five percent representing a 
residential exemption allowed under the Utah Constitution". 
And it does say in that section as we've said, no more than one 
acre. That's that first section. 
Now the next item we come to is - well, let me say, 
let me make a point. No place does it say there about an 
affidavit or an application requirement. Now under 59-2-1101 
which is entitled ^exemptions'. It says "the exemptions 
authorized by this part" and the part is 11, if you look at 
that closely, "maybe allowed only if the claimant owns the 
property January 1st" and then some language about if it's an 
estate. And then it says, "the following property is exempt 
from taxation; property exempt under U. s. law$, property of 
states, counties, and other governmental entities, non profits, 
burial, farm equipment, intangible". Residential Property is 
not listed. Maybe it's just an oversight. I don't know but 
it's not there. But it goes on "the owner who receives the 
exempt status of those items" not mentioning residential, "if 
required by the Commission shall file an affidavit". And then 
it lists certain things that the affidavit is to contain for 
those items and then it says "if the affidavit isn't filed 
within the time limits prescribed by the County Board of 
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1 Equalization, the exempt status may, after notice and hearing, j 
2 be revoked and the property placed on the tax rolls''. And then 
3 it says "the County legislative body may adopt rules to 
4 effectuate the exemptions provided in this p&rt". I don't want 
5 to belabor this but this part, from my reading, doesn't cover 
6 the residential and then it goes on 11-02, "County Board of 
7 Equalization may, after giving notice in a manner prescribed by 
8 rule, determine whether certain property is exempt from 
9 taxation, The decision to be writing" and so forth. 
10 Well, the point I'm trying to make and I'm being a 
11 little redundant, I've concluded - and I do have a question, 
12 but I've concluded that you go to the district court - that you 
13 bypass all of that stuff and the issue is did your taxpayer 
14 qualify? Was he using that as his primary residence? But what 
15 I'm saying is if I'm wrong and you bring all that 
16 administrative procedure into it, is it a constitutional 
17 provision that gives you that and the exemption items don't 
18 seem to eover the residential and therefore, they're now 
19 telling us in 1997 that we needed it back to 1992 for the first 
20 time, may not come into play. 
21 Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Bayles, what is the impact, if any, 
23 that this particular exemption, which is not a complete 
24 exemption like most of those in 11-02, but what's the response 
25 if not there, so where does the requirement for affidavit come 
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from? 
MR. BAYLES: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I missed that. 
THE COURT: Are you relying on 11-02 to give the 
affidavit requirement? 
MR. BAYLES: We are. 
THE COURT: But it does not refer to residential 
exemption. 
MR. BAYLES: It doesn't. 
THE COURT: Isn't there also a rule there that 
requires the affidavit? 
MR. BAYLES: It's in the Utah State Tax Commission. 
THE COURT: Does that refer to the residential? 
MR. BAYLES: It does. 
THE COURT: And so that's more specific? 
MR. BAYLES: It is. 
THE COURT: Sg you're not hanging entirely on 11-02? 
MR. BAYLES: That's correct. 
THE COURT: So what about the argument though that 
it's not there in 11-02, is that affect your constructive 
notice argument? 
MR, BAYLES: It doesn't because it goes to the 
constitutional provision by which the exemption is created. In 
Utah Constitution Article 13, Section 2, sub-section 8, it says 
that the Legislature xmay' provide for a residential property 
tax exemption. Now, implicit in the power to create the 
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exemption is the power to control how it arises and the 
legislature used Section 59-2-1102 to control how this 
exemption arose. Now it may not have actually said residential 
property tax exemption, but that would not be the first time 
that the Legislature used numerous sections of the code 
throughout the code to control a particular subject and that 
would be Summit County's contention on that particular point. 
Does that answer your question? 
THE COURT; Yes, it does. 
MR. BAYLES: The policy behind this application 
requirement is to give Summit County those facts upon which to 
base the exemption and those are the express provisions of 
11-02. Were that section not available to us, there is not 
other way for us to receive those facts and the State taxing 
system is based on this general presumption of taxation and the 
exemption to be applied for. Thank you. 
THE COURT: As I said, you both have briefed it 
thoroughly and have argued the case thoroughly and I'm 
presented with cross motions for summary judgment. I certainly 
find there are no material factual disputes that would bar 
summary judgment in this case. I confess that there is an 
underlying unease about it - and not to criticize any party - I 
think may be that unease is simply that I feel like I'm 
compelled to a certain result and yet I see a very competent 
lawyer in Mr. Marsden having struggled with this for years and 
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followed some paths that seem reasonable that seem to have come 
to no fruition for him and there' s something in that result 
that troubles me. 
Nevertheless/ I feel like we have to go back first to 
what this Court can even examine. Mr. Marden raises the 
question of whether the Court examines the procedures, the 
filing of the affidavit, whether that was appropriate, or 
whether the Court should determine whether in fact the property 
was entitled to the exemption, I don't think that's the case. 
The Court is not the taxing entity. The County is the taxing 
entity. It does the assessment and makes the determination, 
which determination can then be reviewed by the District Court 
after paying of a tax under protest; but that's what the Court 
reviews, whether that was an appropriate decision. The Court 
shouldn't be the one making the decision. We would be assuming 
a role that is not our role. 
For the Court to have any role, it has to done within 
an appropriate time. At first I find that indeed for the years 
1992 through 1996, the Plaintiff did not comply with the 
affidavit requirements and therefore did not overcome the 
presumption of taxing at one hundred percent of value, even if 
it had done that, of course, it would be reduction to the one 
acre, but I don't think we reached that question in this case. 
The statute of limitations raises some difficult 
issues because Mr. Marsden proceeded, I think, in good faith 
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and quite logically but I think he got caught by the two 
options that were available. I find that although it is 
certainly an option under the Blaine Hudson case, and the way 
the law is set forth to proceed along the adminigtrative path, 
that does not toll the statute of limitations and once a tax is 
paid under protest, that it is possible, I'm not making a 
finding, that he had to go to district court suit route, but if 
he wanted to keep that option, he had to do within four years. 
So I don't entirely agree with the Tax Commission that that was 
his only choice but that if he was to sue, that he had to do 
within four years of payment under protest and suit certainly 
was not filed within those four years. 
The savings statute does not apply. The savings 
statute applies to cases filed in the district court that were 
dismissed other than on their merits. A case has to be 
commenced. A cage is commenced by filing gf a complaint and 
then, of course, the next step is service of a summons, usually 
within 120 days but for example, failure to serve that summons 
might result in a dismissal, not on the merits and then that 
case can be renewed within one year if the statute has 
otherwise run. 
In any event, and I confess somewhat reluctantly, but 
I think appropriately, I find that the motion for summary 
judgment is well taken on the basis of, one, failure to file 
the affidavit in 1992 through 1996 and two, on statute of 
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1 limitations, 
2 Will you prepare an order, Mr. Bayles? 
3 MR. BAYLES: Yes 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. 
5 MR. MARSDEN: Your Honor, may I just raise the issue, 
6 isn't the statute of limitations at least open for that year 
7 J 1996? It's a four-year statute of limitations. 
THE COURT: Let's see. 1996 you paid on what date? 
9 I MR. MARSDEN: The payment in 1996? 
10 THE COURT: It probably was late 1996, correct? 
11 MR. MARSDEN: Correct, 
12 THE COURT: And then you, in 1997, by March you did 
13 the application in February, filed it in March, had your 
14 decision in April. I think you're right on the statute of 
15 limitations for 1996 but I've also found that you failed to 
16 make the appropriate application so I agree it should be 
17 modified to say statute of limitations only back 1992 through 
18 1995. I think that's a eorreet clarification. Okay? 
19 Thank you, Mr. Bayles, Mr. Marsden, 
20 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - COALVILLE COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.E. INC., 
vs . 
Plaintiff, 
SUMMIT COUNTY TREASURER Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
CROSS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
Case No: 990600463 PR 
Judge: ROBERT K. HILDER 
Date: April 17, 2000 
Clerk: joyeo 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MILO S MARSDEN 
Defendant's Attorney{s): DAVID L. THOMAS 
DAVID G. BAYLES 
Video 
Tape Count: 1,33-2,27:54 
HEARING 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE PRESENTED, ARGUED AND 
SUBMITTED. 
COURT FINDS THAT THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS THAT COURT CAN 
EXAMINE AS TO WHETHER THE COUNTY IS THE ENTITY TO MAKE THE 
DECISION. 
FIRST, DURING THE YEARS 1992-1996 PLAINTIFF DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION RULES WHO REQUIRES THAT AN AFFIDAVIT 
MUST BE FILED WHEN SOMEONE PAYS THEIR TAXES UNDER PROTEST. 
SECOND, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN FOR THE YEARS 
1992-1995. COURT INSTRUCTS THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS AN OPTION, ONCE THE 
TAX IS PAID UNDER PROTEST AN ACTION HAS TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN 4 
YEARS. 
COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT SAVING THE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY. 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION REQUIRES THAT AN AFFIDAVIT BE FILED 
AND NONE WAS FILED. THE LETTER OF PROTEST IS NOT AN APPLICATION; 
IT IS NOT VERIFIED BY OATH. 
THEREFOR, COURT GRANTS DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FIRST ON NO AFFIDAVIT AND SECOND ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
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Case No: 990600463 
Date: Aor 17, 2000 
MR BAYLES TO PREPARE AN APPROPRIATE ORDER CONSISTANT WITH COURT'S 
RULING ON THE RECORD. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.E., INC. a Utah Corporation, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; 
et. al., 
DEFENDANTS. 
ORDER ON THE PARTIES 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990600463PR 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The parties motions for summary judgment came on for hearing on April 17, 2000. The 
Court has reviewed the motions and memoranda in support and opposition, and has heard the oral 
argument of counsel. There exists no genuine issues of material fact, to wit: 
1. Plaintiff owns the two units of real property in Summit County which are the subject of 
the complaint. 
m.. 
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2. For the tax years 1992 through 1996 the two units of property were taxed at market value 
without reduction for any exemption. 
3. Plaintiff filed a letter with the Summit County Treasurer in each tax year asserting 
payment of property taxes under protest and that the property was not given the benefit of 
a residential property tax exemption. 
4. Plaintiff never filed an application or affidavit for a residential property tax exemption 
with Summit County, pursuant to U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) and the Utah State Tax 
Commission Standards of Practice. 
5. Plaintiff paid his 1995 property taxes on November 30, 1995 and paid his property taxes 
for the years 1992 through 1994 before the end of each year they were due. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate and for the defendants for the following reasons: 
1. It is not the province of the Court to determine whether or not, in fact, the exemption 
applies to the plaintiff; for the Court is not the taxing entity, rather Summit County is the 
taxing entity and it does the assessment and makes the determination. Summit County's 
determination can then be reviewed by the Court after payment of the tax under protest. 
That's what the Court reviews-whether Summit County made the appropriate decision. 
The Court should abstain from being the initial decision maker, such actions being outside 
the role of the judicial branch. 
2 
U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), as amended, and the Utah State Tax Commission Standards of 
Practice require an application filed, under oath, setting forth facts upon which a 
residential property tax exemption may be granted. That application was not filed in this 
case for the tax years in question. 
The presumption favoring the full market value taxation of real property was not overcome 
in the instant case in the absence of the above-referenced application filing. 
A cause of action accrued to the plaintiff at the moment he paid his tax under protest, and 
in each year they were paid under protest, and the applicable statute of limitations is four 
years from the date of a tax payment under protest. Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. 
Juab County. 62 P. 1024, (Utah 1900), U.C.A. §78-12-25. 
Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n. 870 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1994), recognizes 
a taxpayer's option to file in District Court and seek recovery of taxes paid or to pursue 
administrative appeals with the County Board of Equalization; but, neither that case, nor 
any other case or provision of the Utah Code operates to toll the statute of limitations when 
a taxpayer chooses to pursue administrative remedies. Therefore, though a taxpayer is not 
required to pursue a district court remedy, the moment taxes are paid under protest, a 
cause of action must be commenced within four years. 
3 
ORDER 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court now hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES: 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to all unlawful taxation claims 
for all years, no affidavit having been filed for any of the years; and further, the statute of 
limitations bars recovery for the claims from 1992 through and including 1995, the causes of 
action accruing more than four years before the filing of the complaint. Accordingly, plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment is denied. 
DATED this / / — day ^davof A < U- ,2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
ROBEfcT K. HILDER". 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
Milo S/ Marsden, Jr. 
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WORKSHEET OF TAX DIFFERENCE 
(For Failure to Give Residential Exemption 
Under § 59-2-103, Utah Code Annotated) 
1996 Unit 7 
1996 Unit 8 
<* 40 ,872 0° 
$4,216,103 - $48£4fc65 
644,000 = 7,368.65 
x45% 
x45% 3,315.89 * % = « 2 ¥c 
1995 Unit 7 
1995 Unit 8 
3,488,103 = 
560,000 = 
44,333.79 
7,117.60 
x45% 
x45% 
= 19,950.21 
3,20192 X*%,-/°*,r7 
1994 Unit 7 
1994 Unit 8 
1,641,068 = 
393,750 = 
26,844.59 
6,440.96 
x32% 
x32% 
8,590.27 
2,061.11 j<»/^s 4 W 
1993 Unit 7 
1993 Unit 8 
1,641,06s1* = 
393,750* = 
26,320.85 29.5-5=24.5% = 6,448.61 
6,31534 29.5-5=24.5% = 1,547.26 ;%<j-- fltf 
1992 Unit 7 443,750* = 
1992 Unit 8 393,750* = 
TOTAL2 
7,26169 29.5-5=24.5% = 1,779.36 
v-
6,444.38 29.5-5=24.5%= 1.578.87 % *fa **>**-
$7Q,182.ff 
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Taxabla valua for 1992 aad 1993 vaa 9SI of aarkat ralua. 
S 39-2-103 
Beginning January 1, 1992, and avary yaax tharaaftar tha fair markat ralua of 
raaidantial property ahall ba raduead by 29.301, rapraaaatiag a raaidantial 
axaaaption allovad andar Artiela XIII, Sac. 2, Otah Conatitution. 
Beginning January 1, 1994, and arery yaar tharaaftar tha fair narkat ralna of 
raaidantial proparty ihall ba raduead by 321, rapraaaatiag a raaidantial 
•xaaaption allovad ondar Axtiola XXXI, M c . 2, Utah Conatitution. 
Beginning June 1, 199S, tha fair aarkat ralua of raaidaatial proparty a hall 
ba raduead by 43t,repreaenting a raaidantial exemption allowad andar Article 
C X I , See. 2, Utah Conatitution. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A. E., INC., a Utah Corporation, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; ; 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ; 
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT 'y 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; and SUMMIT ; 
COUNTY TREASURER, ; 
Defendants/Appellees. ] 
I NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. 990600463PR 
) (Judge Robert K. Hilder) 
1. Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, A. E., Inc., through counsel, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr., appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order on the parties' 
motions for summary judgment of the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, entered in this 
matter on May 11, 2000. 
2. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment, including but not limited to the 
fact finding that plaintiff never filed an application or affidavit for residential property tax 
Third District Coun ^ ^ 
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exemption with Summit County, or that UCA Section 59-2-1102(3) applies to the 
residential exemption. 
This appeal is also taken from the court's conclusions of law as follows: 
(1) It is not the province of the court to determine 
whether or not, in fact, the exemption applies to the plaintiff, 
for the court is not the taxing entity, rather, Summit County is 
the taxing entity and it does the assessment and makes the 
determination. Summit County's determination can then be 
reviewed by the court after the payment of the tax under 
protest. That's what the court reviews-whether Summit 
County made the appropriate decision. The court should 
abstain from being the initial decision maker, such actions 
being outside the role of the judicial branch. 
(2) UCA, Section 59-2-1102(3), as amended, and the 
Utah State Tax Commission's standards of practice require an 
application filed, under oath, setting forth facts upon which a 
residential property tax exemption may be granted. That 
application was not filed in this case for the tax years in 
question. 
(3) The presumption favoring the full-market value 
taxation of real property was not overcome in the instant case 
in the absence of the above-referenced application filing. 
(4) A cause of action accrued to the plaintiff at the 
moment he paid his tax under protest, and in each year they 
were paid under protest, and the applicable statute of 
limitations is four years from the date of a tax payment under 
protest. Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 62 P. 
1024, (Utah 1900), U.C.A. §78-12-25. 
ORDER 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court now hereby ORDERS, 
ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
2 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted 
as to all unlawful taxation claims for all years, no affidavit 
having been filed for any of the years; and further, the statute 
of limitations bars recovery for the claims from 1992 through 
and including 1995, the causes of action accruing more than 
four years before the filing of the complaint. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied. 
Further appeal is taken from the court docket which states: 
Court finds that there are no material facts that Court 
can examine as to whether the county is the entity to make 
the decision. First, during the years 1992-1996, plaintiff did 
not comply with the Utah State Tax Commission rules which 
require that an affidavit must be filed when someone pays 
their taxes under protest. Second, the statute of limitations 
has run for the years 1992-1995. Court instructs that 
although it is an option, once the taxes are paid under 
protest, an action has to take place within four years. Court 
further finds that the saving statute (78-12-40, Utah Code 
Annotated), does not apply. The Utah State Tax 
Commission requires that an affidavit be filed and none was 
filed. The letter of protest is not an application; it is not 
verified by oath. Therefore, Court grants defendant's motion 
for summary judgment first on no affidavit and second on 
statute of limitations. 
DATED this 3 5 ! day of June, 2000. 
lib S. Ms 
MARSDE^C^HOONwGaTTFREDSON 
& BELL, LLC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL this <fft* 
day of June, 2000, postage prepaid, to Robert W. Adkins, David L. Thomas, and David 
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